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This paper discusses an approach to implementing a FORCEnet architecture 
based on open architecture concepts. Using an architecture-focused methodology, the 
approach provides the following: 
  
1) Characterization of the battle space 
2) Description of the design principles applied and  
3) Conceptual design.  
 
The conceptual design is then modeled using ARENA® simulation software to 
validate the proposed architecture.  
  
The paper concentrates on implementing three very specific scenarios: Engage on 
Remote (EOR), Forward Pass (FP), and Remote Fire (RF). The Open Architecture 
Domain Model is applied to the functional model of these scenarios to develop the 
architectural concept. As a part of the above scenarios, the paper addresses specifics on 
best shooter selection. The resulting functional architecture and data flows transform 
concepts into real engagement methods. These methods match the Detect-Control-
Engage (DCE) sequence with Observe-Orient-Decide and Act (OODA) paradigm using 
current data fusion concepts to provide an Integrated Fire Control (IFC) solution. 
Identified threats on the network can then be matched to any available weapons on the 
network, and the preferred shooter selected can efficiently engage the threat.  Thus, the 
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This paper discusses an approach to implementing a FORCEnet architecture 
based on open architecture concepts. Using architecture-focused methodology, the 
approach provides the following: 
  1) Characterization of the battle space  
2) Description of the design principles applied and  
3) Conceptual design.  
 
The conceptual design is then modeled using ARENA® simulation software to 
validate the proposed architecture.  
The primary focus is on implementing three very specific scenarios: Engage on 
Remote (EOR), Forward Pass (FP), and Remote Fire (RF). The Naval Sea Systems 
Command Program Executive Office (PEO) Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS) Open 
Architecture (OA) domain model is applied to the functional model of these scenarios to 
develop the architectural concept. The IWS OA domain model is decomposed to the 
basic functions employed in specifically implementing these three scenarios. The 
resulting functional architecture and data flows transform concepts into real engagement 
methods. These methods match traditional algorithms such as Detect-Control-Engage 
(DCE) and Observe-Orient-Decide and Act (OODA) using current data fusion 
concepts to provide an Integrated Fire Control (IFC) solution. The system is then 
recomposed to the OA domain model level, and compared to the original conceptual IWS 
OA domain model yielding similarities and differences based on actual implementation. 
Proposed changes and improvements to the model are then suggested based on the 
analysis. A brief summary of the results follows: 
 
1. The Search and Detect functional will assign an immediate low level 
identification of a track so that it can be added to the network almost 
immediately for correlation to tracks on other platforms. Higher fidelity 
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combat identification of tracks can then be performed later in the process 
as originally conceptualized in the IWS OA domain model. 
 
2. Weapon Assets and Services block was completely eliminated primarily 
based on its functions being moved to other functional areas with 
improved efficiency. 
 
3. Force Planning and Coordination block was also eliminated. Joint 
Battle Force Orders (JBFO) and Battle Group Orders (BGO) will be 
broadcast to all platforms simultaneously. The orders will be processed 
through common services and received via EXCOMM. 
 
4. EXCOMM block is considerably expanded, and will assume the “event 
status” of the old weapon/asset services and integrate more directly with 
common services. EXCOMM will call on various communication paths 
dependent on data priority and security requirements for FCS 
transmission, track/threat updates, and direct receipt of intelligence data. 
 
With these improvements, identified threats on the network can then be matched 
to any available weapons on the network, and the preferred shooter selected can 
efficiently engage the threat.  Thus, the effective and efficient use of all sensors and 
weapons available in the battle space becomes possible. 
In conclusion, the analysis performed for this research project has exposed 
potential functional boundary limitations in the currently proposed PEO IWS OA domain 
model as presented, and a revised OA Functional Domain model has been offered for 
consideration.  Through simulation development, test execution and the use of systems 
engineering techniques, this re-structured model has been evaluated and appears to satisfy 
OA and FORCEnet requirements.  
Additional benefits may be gained from expanding the simulation model to 
increase the number of FORCEnet platform participants so as to determine the point at 
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which the OA model becomes inefficient and/or ineffective.  OA specifications and 
system boundary descriptions will eventually attain capacity levels with respect to data 
flow.  This point of diminishing returns relative to battle space size should be identified, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
FORCEnet refers to the architectural and operational framework behind the 
network centric warfare concepts of the Navy's vision for the 21st century, Sea Power 21 
(Clark, 2002). In a letter from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations CNO (Warfare 
Requirements and Programs) dated 6 JAN 2006, the implementation of Open 
Architecture (OA) principles across the Navy Enterprise was set forth as a requirement. 
For FORCEnet to be effective, the nodes that comprise the network must employ 
standardized joint protocols, common algorithms and data packaging, and interoperate in 
a seamless and efficient manner. The architecture of today’s war-fighting computer 
systems cannot support the missions of the emergent Sea Power 21 without embracing 
and becoming OA compliant. Gathering and exchanging information effectively is 
critical to the network centric warfare capability. Sensor derived data from the networked 
platforms are processed, identified, exchanged, then correlated using common data fusion 
techniques. Resultant Fire Control solutions are generated which match the optimal 
platform to the optimal weapon to the highest priority threat. These solutions encompass 
all weapons from all platforms to provide an effective coordinated warfare effort, 
essentially selecting and designating the “best shooter” to engage, intercept, and 
hopefully destroy the threat.  
Successful implementation of the FORCEnet strategy will undoubtedly require a 
dedicated core of warfighters and systems engineers to design and execute a seamless 
operation of what is called a System of Systems (SOS) or Family of Systems (FOS). As 
stated in Sea Power 21, this effort must be administered From the Sea (FTS), From the 
Land (FTL), and From the Air (FTA). This project will concentrate on FTS, and will 
address three specific engagement scenarios representative and typical of a FORCEnet 
tactical environment:   Remote Launch (RL), Forward Pass (FP), and Engage on Remote 
(EOR).   These scenarios have been described in detail in supporting reference documents 
used as a basis for this thesis (Young, 2004).   The goal of this project is to reconstruct 
and validate one of the currently proposed FORCEnet Open Architecture (OA)  
 6
functional schemes, through a top-down, then bottom-up progression, and suggest 
possible model alternatives and improvements. 
B. MOTIVATION 
FORCEnet is defined as the operational construct and architectural framework for 
naval warfare in the Information Age, integrating warriors, sensors, command and 
control, platforms and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force. Narrowing 
this broad view to the concept of FTS and Naval Air defense, an evaluation of FORCEnet 
functional concepts may be accomplished through an examination of the following two 
capability-driven warfighting requirements or Mission Capability Packages (MCPs): 
1. Time Critical Targeting: Time Critical Targeting refers to the ability to 
detect, track, engage and assess time sensitive targets. Time sensitive targets are those 
threats that have an extremely limited window of vulnerability or opportunity where they 
can be detected before becoming hidden. Medium-range missiles such as Theatre 
Ballistic Missiles (TBM) fall within this category. Essentially this corresponds to the 
warfighter’s ability to perform an optimal, seamless, execution of the kill chain. 
2. Cruise Missile Defense (NRC, 2005): An effective Cruise Missile defense 
capability relies on full joint integration of all available defense assets and the 
implementation of a family of systems at the joint level to accomplish the mission.  
FORCEnet concepts and implementation methods are currently being developed 
across many Department of Defense (DoD) activities. However, detailed FORCEnet 
implementation requirements and specifics regarding how open architecture operates 
within the FORCEnet construct have not been fully developed. Within the constraints of 
the FORCEnet Naval Air defense mission, integrated fire control systems design, and 
concepts of operation have not been completely defined and analyzed beyond providing 
high-level domain models. This project attempts to address this gap through the use of 
FORCEnet and open architecture principles to allocate partitioned system functionality 
from the perspective of air defense engagements conducted within an integrated fire 
control systems model. The air defense operational concepts are translated into notional 
system process flows, and from this, a supporting functional design architecture model is 
developed.  
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This systems engineering analysis effort will attempt to develop a conceptual 
match between operational and system architecture requirements using the technical 
requirements of the Open Architecture Domain Model. The analysis will be performed 
using the previously stated Integrated Fire Control (IFC) scenarios of Remote Launch 
(RL), Forward Pass (FP), and Engage On Remote (EOR). Also addressed will be the 
concept of "Best Shooter." The analysis will elaborate on these basic mission capabilities 
and apply them to battle space defensive measures.  
The concept of managing warfare resources across the battle space (e.g. sensors, 
weapons, communication devices) in concert with using data fusion techniques and 
automated decision-making aids is attempted based on the these three operational 
concepts and modeled using a simulation program application called ARENA®. The 
resultant output provides insight into currently proposed architectural models and 
possible alternative methods.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The tasking for this research project, as stipulated within the Open Architecture 
as an Enabler FORCEnet Statement of Work (SOW, Appendix G), is being performed 
in support of a continuing series of FORCEnet research efforts being performed by Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) students.  This 
task is unique in that it investigates the role of FORCEnet within the Open Architecture 
(OA) Functional Domain Model whereas the other tasks investigate the concept of 
coalition Fn and its related performance and acquisition issues. The integration of OA 
within FORCEnet is inevitable, but the detailed implementation requirements regarding 
how open architecture operates within the FORCEnet construct have not been fully 
defined or developed.    
The intent of this project is to examine the recently proposed PEO IWS OA 
Domain Model through various functional levels of decomposition, to determine if there 
is a conceptual match between FORCEnet operational and OA system architecture 
requirements. The analysis will use the Integrated Fire Control (IFC) elements of the 
previously stated MCPs, to construct Remote Launch (RL), Forward Pass (FP), and 
Engage on Remote (EOR) scenarios. The concept of management of warfare resources 
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across the battle space, such as sensors, weapons, and communication devices, in concert 
with new methods of data fusion techniques and automated decision making aids is 
attempted based on the three operational concepts and modeled using the ARENA 
simulation program.  The resultant output provides insight into improved architectural 
models and alternative methods.   
D. OBJECTIVES 
 The analysis intends to accomplish the following primary objectives: 
1. Characterization of the problem space: the identification of current 
system deficiencies as well as existing constraints inherent in the operational 
environment for the purpose of characterizing, understanding and bounding the problem 
space. The analysis will translate relevant operational imperatives into system 
engineering structures (concepts, functions, requirements, solutions) necessary to fully 
develop the FORCEnet OA (Fn/OA) concepts. 
2. Design principles: the formulation of principles for the design and 
architecting of OA and IFC capabilities. The design principles will serve as guidelines for 
the development of system solutions. Design principles will consider known limitations 
and constraints of the operational environment such as communication challenges 
(unreliability, ad hoc mobile networks, limited bandwidth, etc.) and operator interactions 
(command authority, manual overrides, etc.). 
3. Conceptual design: method development, architecture, and a conceptual 
framework that addresses the problem space and is based on design principles for a 
distributed system of automated decision aids for optimally managing warfare resources 
operating within a collaborative environment  
4. Functional representation and decomposition: the representation of 
system concepts through functional description and decomposition as well as system 
architecting and simulation. Develop representations, models, and methods to express 
automated resource collaboration concepts and solutions in the context of the Fn/OA 
architecture domain. 
5. Analysis of key capabilities: the identification and evaluation of 
technologies and research areas key to the FORCEnet OA concept. Technology areas that 
will be researched and analyzed include: 
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a. Data fusion techniques and algorithms 
b. Resource management scheduling and optimization methods 
c. Weapon and sensor management for aerospace warfare 
d. Automated management aids 
e. Engagement functionality, initialization, and control 
 
f. Situation prediction  
g. Tactical planning and battle management 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The architectural view of the PEO IWS model provided the basis and starting 
point for this project.  From the systems engineering perspective, questions such as the 
following needed to be asked:  Is this design feasible? Will it satisfy FORCEnet IFC 
functional, system, and operational requirements while maintaining and complying with 
OA design principles? Will a simulation modeling and test process identify any 
deficiencies and lead to recommendations for improvement?  To evaluate and answer 
these questions, a unique architectural-based systems engineering methodology was 
formulated and used.     
The PEO IWS OA model provided the initial architectural framework and 
conceptual representation of expected FORCEnet domain rules, resources and functional 
relationships.  To validate this model, the functional and modular integration needed to 
be proven to determine if it would support likely FORCEnet the IFC elements of the 
Mission Capability Packages.  To better understand the modular interaction, descriptions 
of the functional blocks were developed and further modular de-composition was 
performed.  This was then repeated until three levels of functional de-composition had 
been achieved.  Data inputs and outputs, communication flows and control points were 
added based on three typical Integrated Fire Control scenarios.  This level of functional 
characterization provided the path necessary to move forward with the simulation 
modeling and development.  With simulation development and test trial runs, feedback 
was provided as to whether data flows, modular and node interactions were valid and 
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optimal.  Iterations to the simulation and functional models were then performed to better 
functionally represent the interplay involved.  The functional model was refined and 
compared to the PEO IWS model to complete the process.  
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II. LITERATURE 
The literature review section has been divided into three subsections. The first 
section presents an overview of the literature used to define the scope of the problem 
space used as a basis for this project. The second section reviews some of the more 
pertinent and informative research material available on FORCEnet OA implementation 
to date and identifies positions that should be considered when developing a detailed, 
scenario based architecture. Some of the works reviewed provide a basis to forecast the 
manner in which FORCEnet OA will be implemented. Several of these forecasts are 
compared with the results and conclusions derived from this project. The third section 
reviews several of the early and more recent notable expert opinions on proposed 
FORCEnet OA implementation strategies. 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM SPACE 
An OA system has been defined as a non-proprietary, commercially available 
computer system that supports the following attributes with minimal cost and minimal 
impact on existing system components: 
• Use of public, consensus-based standards 
• Adoption of standard interfaces and protocols to facilitate new or 
additional systems capabilities for diverse applications 
• Adoption of standard services and defined functions 
• Use of product types supported by multiple vendors 
• Selection of stable vendors with broad customer base and large market 
share 
• Interoperability with minimal integration requirements 
• Ease of scalability and upgradeability 
• Portability of applications 
But what exactly does it take to achieve an OA implementation in a FORCEnet 
construct? There are several key ingredients necessary: 
1. Well-defined and easily understandable system boundaries at various levels 
must be constructed. 
 12
2. The interfaces that exist at these system boundaries must be described in detail 
using established commercial or Department of Defense (DoD) standards.  
3. Starting at the highest level of system and boundary descriptions, subsystem 
descriptions and interface definitions must be capable of two or more layers of 
decomposition based on established and traditional system engineering 
practices.  
In the “FORCEnet Implementation Strategy” guide (NRC 2006), functional 





















Figure 1.   Boundaries Between Functions in FORCEnet 
Information Architecture (FORCEnet 




Using the principle behind this conceptual model, the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO 
IWS) division has developed an OA Domain Model consisting of a first level functional 
decomposition. The PEO IWS OA Domain Model (Figure 2) illustrates how the various 
key functions necessary within the FORCEnet construct may be allocated and identifies 
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the expected data flow interactions between the various sub-functions. With the PEO 
IWS OA Domain Model Concept used as the starting point, this research project will 
proceed to use one of the well recognized Systems Analysis Tools, the Functional Flow 
Block Diagram (FFBD), as defined in Systems Engineering and Analysis (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 1998) to decompose each functional block down two additional levels and 
construct a simulation model to support these processes. The simulation model is then 
used to test and apply specific FORCEnet mission scenarios and validate the PEO IWS 
OA Domain Model Concept using a bottom up systems engineering approach. 
 
 
Figure 2.   PEO IWS OA Domain Model Concept (Combat 
Identification for Naval Systems in an Open 
Architecture, Strei, 2003) 
 
 
As described in the 2006 publication “FORCEnet Implementation Strategy” by 
the National Research Council (NRC), boundary definitions and the granularity with 
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which they are defined are keys to the successful OA implementation within the 
FORCEnet arena. The total number of boundaries must not exceed those that can be 
reasonably managed, and the cost to maintain those boundaries must not exceed the 
benefits achieved through interoperability.  
Although this project focuses on boundaries more than standards, the following 
six categories of core architectural elements have been considered: 
1. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
2. Weapon systems 
3. Command and control support 
4. Network services 
5. Networks 
6. Communication Systems 
Using these architectural elements and well established commercial and DoD standards 
to define the “Open” in OA, virtually any sensor can be accessed by any command and 
control system that can direct any fire control system using any weapon. Human 
monitoring of the network will be required, however, and human intervention and 
overrides are considered inherent in the design.  
The ultimate success of FORCEnet relies heavily on having a time critical 
network. Battle space size and the ability of the Battle Force to effectively manage and 
dominate this space are directly related to the speed of data collection and transmission 
and its efficient, secure, dissemination across the network. This project assumes a 
decentralized decision-making concept. This means that the decision-making process 
supporting the FORCEnet mission is not constrained to any one platform. Based on 
sophisticated data fusion techniques, high priority data is throttled across system 
boundaries so that local and remote decision-making can quickly respond to high priority 
threats and effective “best shooter” decisions can be made. In some cases however, the 
“best shooter” may not be capable of detecting the threat with their local sensors, and 
only an awareness of the threat will emanate from the network. The quality of network 
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service must be sufficiently high enough so that commanding officers on both the firing 
and controlling platforms are fully confident in the validity of the threat and the ability to 
execute the engagement. Metrics must be established that monitor track detection time, 
identification time, and decision time. Performance metrics will drive change 
management not only of the interface standards, but of the system development spirals. 
Reliable, timely, and accurate data is critical to the success of the system. 
Vulnerabilities of FORCEnet must also be considered when selecting interface 
standards and establishing system boundaries for the OA design. Many of these 
vulnerabilities are similar to those encountered during daily use of the Internet. Although 
unauthorized entry, sabotage, poisoned data, and denial-of-service are a few of the 
difficult challenges that should be factored into FORCEnet OA implementation, they are 
not within the scope of this project. Vulnerability as a result of system complexity and the 
need for graceful degradation when system components fail however, were considered 
during project development  
Several key principles outlined in “FORCEnet Implementation Strategy” (NRC 
2006), were considered during project and concept development: 
• Partitioning common functions in a common consistent manner 
• Minimizing the number of interfaces involved 
• Cost and maintenance associated with network management 
• Measuring and prioritizing data flows 
• Applying system concepts to specific missions to validate results. 
 
B.  IMPLEMENTING FORCENET – WORK ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE 
1. Legacy Models: When considering Unit-level and Force-level network 
centric battle operations, an examination of the legacy conceptual models upon which the 




a. Detect, Control, Engage (DCE) sequence 
b. Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) sequence 
c. Data Fusion Model.  
The DCE model is one of the earliest models and a common tool that has been used for 
many years. The OODA loop and Data Fusion model, developed by Colonel John Boyd 
and the Joint Directors Laboratory (JDL) Data Fusion Group, respectively, were both 
introduced in 1987. In a paper titled "A Self-Consistent Context for Unit and Force Level 
Tactical Decision-Making", Luessen provides a good illustration on how these three 




















Figure 3.   Integration of DCE, OODA and Data Fusion Models 
(A Self-Consistent Context for Unit and Force Level 
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Although not within the scope of this paper, each portion of the PEO IWS OA 
Domain Model could likely be mapped to a portion of the DCE, OODA, and Data Fusion 
Integration model. Additionally mirroring the OA Domain model, a lower level 
functional decomposition of this model could also be performed. 
The integrated diagram (Figure 3) depicted by Luessen illustrates the manner in 
which Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) and Information Exchange 
Effectiveness (IEE) are directly related to the transmission of information across the 
Battle Force and the interoperability effectiveness within Battle Force. Luessen begins 
with the DCE sequence at the Combat System Unit level, expands this sequence to the 
Force level, then applies the fusion processes at the Battle Force level to complete the 
Force-Level Command and Control (C2) representation of the engagement decision-
making process. The accuracy of the data and the efficiency of its transmission from 
signal detection at the sensor grid level (Level 0) through the Common Tactical Picture 
(Level 2), then through the Force-level weapon assignment and coordination level (Level 
4), are the keys to effecting successful execution of the Battle Force engagement 
sequence. Both Unit and Force-level reaction time and the quality of the engagement 
decision, directly speak to the ability of the Force-level players to execute the mission 
and dominate the battle space. In this environment, C2 Operators are able to exploit both 
the common operational and tactical pictures to process and manage a clear coherent, 
unambiguous (non-dual) tracking picture where tracks of high interest and threats can be 
readily identified and prioritized. This heightened situational awareness enables three key 
capabilities: 
a) The ability to effectively prosecute and engage threats 
b) The ability to maintain positive identification of non-threats 
c) The ability to minimize wasted resources in both the sensor and weapon 
grids 
This diagram also illustrates that provided a minimum of three pieces of data are 
available, one decision-making process can be effectively employed at both the Unit and 
Force levels. These data points are: 
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a) track kinematics 
b) track identification 
c) the engagement status of the track 
Since 1987, the same general data fusion model has been used and deployed at the 
platform and command and control level. In a paper titled "Revisions to the JDL Data 
Fusion Model" (Steinberg et al, 1999), Steinberg provides us with a good pictorial 














Figure 4.    Data Association uses overlapping sensor 
capabilities so that State Estimation can exploit their 
complimentary capability (Revisions to the JDL Data 
Fusion Model, Steinberg, 1999) 
 
Employing the Data Fusion Levels 0 through 4 functions first identified by 
Luessen (Figure 3), automated algorithms process the information generated in Figure 4, 
reducing it down to a quality fused output that operators can use with confidence to make 
decisions and take the best course of action. As Steinberg, Bowman, and White point out, 
however, there is more that is required within the data fusion loop. Because data fusion is 
used to estimate the state of some aspect of the real world, the process must also consider 
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what data is available to the intended target, and how the intended target may perceive 
that data and react. The data that is available to the target is termed the informational 
state and how the target estimates the world state is called the perceptual state. Using this  
means of data association, data fusion can make a hypothesis about the target and plan 
possible responses. Figure 5 illustrates how the data that is available to each entity in the 
relationship may be perceived, and how they may be related back to the physical state for 
making a more informed and substantiated decision. In developing the proposed 













Figure 5.    Information available to each entity, perceptions, 
and relation back to the physical (Revisions to the 
JDL Data Fusion Model, Steinberg, 1999) 
 
2. Integrated Fire Control: Advances in Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
technology, and its implementation, enabled the development of advanced fire control 
systems and allowed disbursed friendly forces, operating in a common tactical 
environment, to act seamlessly together as a virtual single unit to detect, engage, and 
destroy aerospace targets. Fundamental to this ability is the development and 
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employment of NCW capability within the Navy and Joint Forces. As stated in 
"Integrated Fire Control (IFC) for Future Aerospace Warfare" (Young, 2004), “Future 
advances in fire control for aerospace warfare depend largely on a Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) foundation that enables the collaborative use of distributed warfare 
assets for time-critical aerospace operations.” 
IFC is defined as the ability of a weapon system to develop fire control solutions 
from information provided by one or more non-organic sensor sources; conduct 
engagements based on these fire control solutions; and either provide mid-course 
guidance (in-flight target updates) to the interceptors based on this externally provided 
information or in certain cases, have them provided by a warfare unit other than the 
launching unit. As stated in the "SIAP Operational Concept" (Young, 2002), in order for 
IFC to be effective, warfare platforms must have the ability to share engaged target 
information in real-time and eliminate correlation errors as though the information was 
produced by a single unit using its’ own organic sensors. 
From an operational perspective, IFC collaborative efforts take several forms and 
each requires various levels of coordination and data sharing. In her paper, Young 
introduces six types of operational perspectives or variants of IFC. 
a. Precision Cue: a remote unit cues a local unit to detect and engage target 
with local sensors and weapons. 
b. Launch on Remote (LOR): remote data is used to initiate a local missile 
launch without holding the target locally; local data is used to support 
mid-course and terminal missile guidance phases. 
c. Engage on Remote (EOR): remote data is used to support all engagement 
phases of a locally launched missile. 
d. Forward Pass (FP): control of an in-flight missile is handed off to another 
unit to complete the engagement. 
e. Remote Fire (RF): a launch decision to fire a local missile is made by a 
remote unit; either the local or remote unit can control the engagement. 
f. Preferred Shooter: when the optimum weapon, or weapons, from a group 
of collaborative warfare units is selected to intercept a target threat. 
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Although the six variants above can be thought of as requiring separate processing 
paths within a system to complete, in a truly integrated collaborative fire control system, 
each scenario would use common processing architectures both at the local level and at 
the collaborative systems level. Collaboration between weapons units to achieve true IFC 
requires that systems be designed from a force-centric perspective where all resources for 
the weapons engagement are considered a system of systems using common algorithms 
and common processing. Young states some of the design challenges needed to achieve 
IFC, 
(an) . . . IFC challenge lies in the necessary paradigm shift ofengagement 
functionality moving out of weapons systems and instead being performed 
by common processors across warfare units. 
In a non-IFC environment, each warfare unit and their respective weapon systems 
are focused on their own ability to engage and whether it can intercept the target within 
its own engagement area. The weapon system does not have a broader, force centric 
perspective to draw from and cannot determine if it is the best shooter in the Force, as it 
will only consider local sensor support. 
When considering an IFC system design, many concepts must be well thought out 
prior to implementation. This includes the use of centralized or decentralized 
communications and control architectures, levels of automation, and control authority of 
weapons assets across multiple units. Most of these concepts are beyond the scope of this 
project, but ideally (as proposed by Young) the IFC concept will be based on the 
following three fundamental systems characteristics: 
1. dynamically updateable doctrine 
2. decentralized architecture and synchronized information, 
3. doctrine and decision aides.  
Furthermore, Young has identified four key capability requirements to enable the IFC 
concept: 
1. Shared Situational Awareness (also described by Leussen) 
2. Determining the Best Course of Action (COA) 
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3. Distributed Resource Management (DRM) 
4. Embedded IFC Planning 
Shared Situational Awareness (SA): SA is the ability of distributed units to gain 
a common understanding of the tactical situation, to include the threat, defended assets, 
available resources, and the constraints in which the systems must operate. This 
important capability relies on each warfare unit using common data processing and data 
fusion algorithms to develop a tactical picture that accurately represents the ground truth 
target data and current operating environment. Shared situational awareness relies on 
appropriate information architecture to enable the sharing of data between units. For the 
purpose of this project, this architecture is assumed to be the implementation of 
FORCEnet among all participating units. The architecture must remain flexible and 
maintain the ability to share the different time domains of tactical data. Time domains of 
data range from non-real time information on distant targets, or potential launch 
platforms from intelligence sources, to virtual real-time update rate exchanges required to 
calculate accurate fire control solutions on high-speed maneuverable targets such as anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCM). 
Determining the Best Course of Action (COA): The ability to determine the 
Best Course of Action involves predicting the various operational situations and 
hypothesizing about the effects of alternative COAs. Predicting enemy COAs allows for 
effective resource management of collaborative surveillance, tracking, and weapons 
assets based on the confidence levels associated with enemy capabilities and intentions. 
This is primarily accomplished through automated war-gaming methods that are beyond 
the scope of this project. 
Distributed Resource Management: DRM is used to enable and optimize the 
use of distributed weapon assets used in an IFC environment. It is the capability that 
allocates the prioritized tasks to the optimum sensor and weapons resources. Task 
prioritization must be updated automatically and continually for optimization of assets 
and to determine “best shooter” scenarios. It must take into account both system failures 
and new resources joining the Force to provide for allocation of available resources at all  
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times during critical windows of the engagement. DRM, with particular emphasis on 
sensor management, will be addressed in greater depth when NCW based command and 
control is discussed. 
Embedded IFC planning: Embedded IFC planning allows planners to establish 
engagement doctrine to guide automated IFC systems in decision-making capabilities. 
These doctrines can be preloaded into the system based on information regarding the 
anticipated operating environment and can also be modified dynamically using 
collaborative means so that all systems are operating from the same set of rules and 
decision-making guidelines. 
3. Combat Identification (CID): The basic construct in establishing a 
unified Force-Level battle space where well-coordinated combat decisions can be 
effected is the presence of a unified CID process. In the "Combat Identification (CID)" 
white paper generated for PEO IWS (Young 2006), Young explores the current state and 
scope of CID capabilities and examines what levels of development and maturation are 
necessary to support Joint Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) and the Navy’s future 
immersion in OA. 
The objective of an effective CID process involves the accurate, timely and 
sustainable characterization and classification of tracks to facilitate early threat and 
resource awareness and enable optimal weapon engagement planning and execution in a 
distributed shared environment. Invariably, any improvements in this area further 
enhance confidence in situational awareness and optimize command and control level 
decision-making. 
The current means to ascertain and identify battle space objects has been through 
a combination of the following: 
a. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
b. Local sensor data 
c. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Two future capabilities proposed by Young are the use of a centralized 
geographical database and the implementation of a shared resource picture. The 
geographical database concept would maintain and monitor the friendly forces picture 
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within a given region. The location, size, status and identity of all Joint and Coalition 
Forces would be provided, automatically updated as locations change, and periodically 
synchronized to allow all units a common friendly forces tactical picture. The resource 
picture is essentially a complement to the “friendly force” picture, but depicts data from 
friendly force resources such as sensors, weapons, communication links, etc. This data 
provides the information necessary to perform collaborative resource management across 
the Battle Force. Young reiterates that CID systems of the future will undoubtedly need 
to adopt all five of these methods, combining the information from Intelligence Sensors 
(Intel) and IFF with remote and local fire-control and surveillance radars through data 
fusion and process refinement. Figure 6 illustrates Young’s concept of a CID fusion 




















According to Young, future CID systems should have the following characteristic 
capabilities, all of which are inherent to the Open Architecture paradigm: 
a. Common CID deterministic results: Each units CID process will 
implement the same logic path, rule sets, algorithms, and prioritization 
schemes, thus ensuring cohesion within the common operational 
environment and rule out ambiguity and uncertainty in the assessment 
process. CID systems will qualify information sources and assign the 
resultant objects (tracks) confidence levels based on the quality of the data 
source. This duplication scheme will ensure a high level of shared 
situational awareness and a distribution of common results among the 
units. The commonality of these results will subsequently minimize the 
variability in command and control decision-making within the FORCEnet 
and could greatly reduce if not eliminate fratricide. Common CID 
Capability will rely on a networked communication system among the 
FORCEnet units that can relay CID related information in a time-critical 
fashion. 
b. Common CID Functionality: As previously stated, units will need to 
obtain, share, process, perform object identification and resolve 
differences in accordance with the “capabilities of the sensor and 
communication capabilities as well as the ability to automate and use other 
data/information sources such as Intel, friendly force, defended asset, and 
resource status information”. Functions need to consider questions such 
as: 
• “Does the system use all available data?” 
• “Does the system properly evaluate the “goodness” of the data 
and calculate confidence levels which accurately reflect this?” 
• “Are multiple CID systems able to make identical CID 
determinations?” 
c. Support Joint Warfare Operating Environment: Integration of 
Naval, Marine, Army, Air Force and coalition forces is one of the key 
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principles to ensure FORCEnet fully exploits the management, range and 
utilization of available weapons and resources. The more encompassing 
and open FORCEnet is with respect to the current and emergent Joint 
services, the greater the improvement in situational awareness. Common 
CID practices designed using OA principles will facilitate implementation 
across all military platforms. The following CID development standards 
are offered by Young for consideration: 
• Standardized data strategy and CID taxonomy 
• Standards for data sharing/transmission 
• Standards for databases 
• Common algorithms for processing CID data and making 
 CID determinations 
• Common training for Joint and Coalition Force Operators 
in identifying battle space objects based on CID sources 
d. Effective CID Data Strategy: A common data processing strategy 
where relevant data is apparent, trusted, interoperable, precise, timely and 
visible. 
e. Span Warfare Areas: For maximum combat effectiveness surface, 
subsurface, space, and air resource assets must be integrated within the 
CID process. 
f. Increased level of Automation: Future CID capabilities should focus 
on automating as many processes as possible. This will reduce the amount 
of variability that can be introduced into the system, inject higher levels of 
process efficiency, and ultimately shorten the detect/control/engage 
sequence. 
g. Isolate CID processes: Utilize good sound OA design practices by 
modularizing and thereby isolating the CID process from other Combat 
System applications. This design principle reduces life cycle costs and 
supports technological insertion while minimizing adaptive component 
requirements. The benefits of this can also be realized during the test and 
 27
evaluation phase where CID sub-components, algorithms, and timing 
thresholds can be evaluated and analyzed separately to ensure optimal 
results are attained. 
4. Command and Control: A Command and Control (C2) system for future 
aerospace warfare inevitably depends on NCW solutions. In "C2 System for Future 
Aerospace Warfare" (Young, 2004), Young describes that the C2 system’s role is to 
optimize the resources both offensively and defensively to combat the aerospace threats. 
NCW-enabled C2 will enhance time-critical operational response by using the distributed 
warfare assets to select the best shooter from a set of geographically distributed firing 
units and to increase the chances of intercepting and eliminating multiple redundant shots 
to the targets. A prime example of collaborative C2 capability is the Integrated Fire 
Control (IFC) system.  
Young further describes the Peer Computing Program (PCP), also known as the 
Integrated Architecture Behavior Model (IABM) that resides on each participating joint 
warfighting unit. The Joint SIAP System Engineering Organization (JSSEO) is using this 
program to develop a SIAP Distributed System concept to provide a NCW foundation for 
future joint C2 operations. The distributed SIAP system concept illustrated in Figure 7, 
involves multiple peers or PCPs acting together to provide interface interaction with the 
external non-SIAP entities within the operational scenario. 
 
Figure 7.    SIAP Distributed System Context Diagram (C2 
System for Future Aerospace Warfare, Young, 2004) 
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Figure 8 further illustrates the manner in which each PCP-equipped unit employs 
the common processing methodology (identical computational and algorithmic methods) 
inherent to the SIAP philosophy. 
 
Figure 8.   SIAP Common Processing Philosophy (C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare, Young, 2004) 
 
Core Peer Computing Program Capabilities: The core PCP capabilities 
function used to create the SIAP consists of common, continual and unambiguous tracks 
derived from real time and near real time data of airborne objects. The external interfaces 
of a single PCP unit are illustrated in the Figure 9, the PCP Context Diagram. 
Information Architecture: The supporting information architecture required for 
SIAP is achieved through the establishment, maintenance and management of Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) networks. A greatly improved situational awareness exists because of the 
netting together of information derived from these participating units. This unique 
collaboration involves a timely distribution, sharing, and integration of tactical 
information and warfare assets (sensors, weapons, warfighting units). Each participating 
unit uses the data fusion and tracking algorithms common to the PCP framework to take 
full advantage of raw data coming from the P2P communications network. An example 
of the SIAP Information Architecture concept is provided below (Figure 10). 
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Figure 9.   PCP Context Diagram (C2 System for Future 





Figure 10.   SIAP Information Architecture (C2 System for 
Future Aerospace Warfare, Young, 2004) 
 
Transmission of large amounts of data in a timely fashion is required to support 
both the information architecture and a decentralized distributed Command and Control 
(C2), both of which are considered critical for NCW operation. 
 30
Concepts for Future Joint C2: The future joint C2 concept’s basic premise is 
the philosophy of Common Processing where all PCP-equipped warfighting units will 
construct a common track picture from identically distributed data sets with common data 
processing and decision-making algorithms. These capabilities will build on the existing 
core SIAP PCP functions and will enable operation in an automated and coordinated 
fashion to produce identical Force-level decision recommendations. Figure 11 shows a 
diagram of a proposed future PCP functionality. 
 
Figure 11.   Future PCP Functionality (Young, 2004) 
 
Advanced Situational Awareness/Assessment: The SIAP concept is based on a 
high level of situational awareness (SA), which is the ability of the collective peers to 
share a common understanding of the operational situation including the threat, the 
defended assets, the readiness of warfighting resources and the command and control 
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constraints. SA provides each peer with an accurate picture from a set of information that 
is updated on a continuous basis to most accurately reflect the real state of the battle 
space situation. The SA aspects of the operational situation include track picture, object 
context, threat picture, defended assets picture, warfighting resources, the environmental 
picture, and the C2 situation. 
 Situation Prediction/War gaming: Situation Prediction (SP) is identified as 
determining the potential impact of the Force’s planned actions based on using a future 
prediction of the current situation to estimate the enemy course of action (COA). SP uses 
Automated Management Aids (AMA) to project enemy COA based on the real-time, near 
real-time and non-real-time operational situation. The SP function is comprised of 
Environmental Prediction, War-fighting Resource Projection, and War gaming or 
Event/Consequence Prediction. 
5. Sensor Resource Management (SRM): "Naval Network-Centric Sensor 
Resource Management," (Johnson(Young)/Green 2002) describes the existing 
deficiencies associated with legacy Naval Battle Force sensor management and explores 
solutions for a network-centric sensor resource manager as a part of a Battle Force system 
of systems. SRM enables and optimizes the use of resources from the Naval Battle Force. 
Historically, the Navy has utilized a platform-centric foundation to independently address 
one mission area at a time. As more platforms were introduced, the complexity within the 
tactical environment increased and an effective management of Battle Force resources 
became crucial. This is to say, legacy system limitations have presented an enormous 
challenge. Cooperative sensor resource management is affected by legacy link formats 
and use of bandwidth and communication hardware. Existing architecture constraints do 
not provide for data distribution across the Battle Force to support SRM and NCW 
concepts. The Battle Force has to be considered from a network-centric and system-of-
systems perspective to understand how commands and tasks can be executed. A lack of 
standardization in existing naval systems causes differences in commands and processes 
which ultimately translate into a lack of synchronization among the platforms. 
Required Enablers for Cooperative SRM: Two key enablers to establish a 
Cooperative SRM are the establishment of a common synchronized Battle Force 
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information database and an automated link manager. As depicted in Figure 12, the three 
realms of the Battle Force Common Operational Picture (COP), Common Tactical 
Picture (CTP), and the Fire Control Picture (FCP) are synchronized into a Battle Force 
information database to achieve information superiority. By maintaining consistent 
situational awareness across the battle space, the Naval Battle Force establishes effective 
management of the threats and operations. The SRM concept includes managing sensors 
and networking resources from a decentralized platform perspective to maximize the area 




Figure 12.   Three Realms of Battle Force Information (Naval 
Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management, 
Johnson/Green, 2002) 
Automated control of data distribution throughout the Battle Force is an enabler 
of network-centric sensor management. The limitations of bandwidth can constrain the 
transmission and receipt of data among Battle Force platforms. The solution to 
effectively utilize bandwidth is to limit the distribution of data based on the current 
mission needs of the Battle Force. Figure 13 provides a representation of how this 




Figure 13.   Intelligent Link Resource Management Concept 
(Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource 
Management, Johnson/Green, 2002) 
 
The automated and distributed resource management system places a link 
manager at each decision node. This link manager maintains tracks, determines feasibility 
and need for transmission, then issues mission-related commands to other link managers 
and transmits data as required. 
Benefits of Cooperative SRM: It is expected that the following advantages may 
be realized from the implementation of network-centric sensor resource management: 
a. An increase in target tracking accuracy across the battle space 
b. A decrease in degraded surveillance zones 
c. An increase in the detection range of the Battle Force 
d. A decrease in the average Battle Force reaction time 
e. Enable better utilization of sensor assets 
f. Enable greater remote engagement capability resources  
 
The essence of Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management is that it will 
enable information superiority by allowing earlier decisions to be made based on more 




C.  EARLY OPEN ARCHITECTURE INTERPRETATIONS 
“OA the Critical NCW Enabler” (Rushton, First Edition, dated March 18, 2004) 
sets the stage on why OA is imperative to attaining full enablement of our wartime 
potential in the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) arena. Through a close examination of 
the threats and environments the Navy was challenged with defending in the past, 
Rushton helps us in understanding the different challenges that we face now. There is a 
compelling case for OA, stating that rapid, technological globalization demands that we 
utilize NCW and embrace OA to successfully combat present and future asymmetric 
terrors. The technical conditions needed to fully achieve joint interoperability, network 
sensor assets, and ensure information is seamlessly shared, demands the adoption of OA. 
Rushton provides guidance, motivation, and justification for the work accomplished by 
this thesis. That being said, we will reiterate some of his commentary to capture some 
key fundamental concepts that were used as a basis for this research project. 
Historically, tactical combat system capabilities were designed to defend against 
the “blue water” threats associated with the Cold War. Namely, integrated fire control 
systems were platform-centric in that they were Point-to-Point, closed, tight-looped 
systems, co-locating sensors with weapons, operating to minimize the time from sensor 
detection, to command and control, to weapon engagement.  As the Cold War passed, 
technology evolved at an unprecedented rate, rendering the tactical weapon systems of 
US Navy ships unaffordable to maintain. DoD realized the phenomenal potentials 
associated with Internet Protocol (IP) based systems. Additionally, the battle space 
continuum now involved threats in the littoral region, threats often masked from platform 
co-located sensors and weapons. The Navy, seeing they were ill equipped to meet the 
new challenges, expanded its requirements base and developed FORCEnet concept of 
operations. FORCEnet bases it foundation on a shared implementation of a global 
information network and its framework on OA system design principles, standards, and 
architecture. OA enables a new approach that exploits open systems and Commercial 
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) integration, allowing for easier management of technology 
insertion through reusable adaptive software components. 
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OA systems employ two fundamental elements: a technical architecture defined 
by the standards and guidance set forth in the OA Computing Environment (OACE) 
Technologies and Standards (NSWC, Dahlgren Division, 04 Sept 2003) and a “functional 
architecture embracing of an agreed upon framework of functional allocations, 
common/standard applications and services”. Criteria for OA compliant categories have 
been developed and are defined in Figure 14 below: 
 
 
Figure 14.   OA Compliance Categories (OACE Technologies and 
Standards, NSWC, Dahlgren Division, 04 Sept 2003) 
 
The majority of today’s combat systems are Categories 1 and 2, non-modularized 
systems where the hardware and software is coupled. SSDS MK2 MOD 3B will be the 
first OA Category 3 compliant system, meaning the software is not constrained to the 
hardware infrastructure. SSDS MK2 MOD3B is currently in its final development stages. 
Category 4 will implement common services and applications such as correlation/de-
correlation algorithms, threat identification rankings and cross-platform track 
management. The OACE is based on a commercially modeled principle that separates 
and decouples hardware and software, see Figure 15. While its benefits and design, are 
well documented, developed, and understood, the OA functional architecture may not.  
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Figure 15.   OA Computing Environments (Open Architecture in 
Naval Combat System Computing of the 21st 
Century, Strei, 2003) 
 
The OA functional architecture provides the characterization and functional 
framework for enabling optimal networked warfighting capability. It partitions the OA 
system into functionally logical modules from a Combat Systems perspective while 
reducing duplication and eliminating service-specific related objects. The guiding 
functional principle is to construct a system which can be installed on any FORCEnet 
unit and when operational will seamlessly network with other OA participating units, 
sharing sensors, INTEL data, managing tracks, weapon resources and fire control 
solutions. The effort will achieve a uniform common operational and command and 
control picture, one that is fully optimized for the warfighter.  Rushton also offers us the 
PEO IWS OA Functional Domain Model, but does not delve further into its functional 
constructs. He does state however that a common agreement must be made regarding 
common servicing of time, navigation, data registration, and the establishment of a core, 
common, joint track manager application. Successful joint network-centric decision-
making, Common Identification (CID) and IFC are all premised on precise and timely 
track reporting and cohesion of the operational picture. 
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One clear objective of Open Architecture (OA) is to enable faster insertion of new 
technologies and systems with less complexity to produce superior and more affordable 
weapon systems. Similar to the Rushton concept, "Open Architecture in Naval Combat 
System Computing of the 21st Century," (Strei 2003) provides insight into a possible OA 
implementation in FORCEnet. Strei proposes that using non-proprietary COTS 
technologies along with commercial standards for products, specifications, and standards 
will allow greater reuse of computer programs and a broader vendor base upon which to 
draw. 
The Challenge of Accelerating Computing Technologies: Acceleration in 
computing technologies started after the launch of Sputnik by Soviet Union in 1957. New 
U. S. defense requirements and virtually an unlimited budget at that time set the pace for 
the development of custom-designed computer hardware and tightly coupled software 
due to unavailability in the commercial or civilian sectors. 
In the 1980s, the computing requirements in the commercial and civilian sectors 
resulted in unprecedented innovation and product development in commercial 
marketplace. Increase in demand for information technology and systems in the 
commercial marketplace caused the prices to fall due to advent of low-cost, high-
performance microprocessor chips and associated hardware. These developments caused 
the custom-designed military computer and system to fall behind their commercial 
counterparts in fundamental capabilities and economies of scale. 
An Integrated Warfare Approach: The PEO IWS approach is to maximize 
fundamental commonality and interoperability across warships, aircraft, weapons, 
sensors and basically any defense program. To achieve this, PEO IWS architecture 
requires consolidation of Navy computing systems into a single open-system 
emphasizing common “core” computing architecture and standards and deriving a 
warfare systems functional architecture within the OA. This approach mirrors the 
approach upon which this project is based. 
The Navy OA program will develop and evolve common warfare applications, 
services, and computing resources all in a single implementation cycle rather than 
independently across multiple programs. These also require adoption of open commercial 
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information system technology standards and non-proprietary standard interfaces, 
services, and formats that are available on mainstream COTS system. The portability, 
scalability, extensibility, and flexibility are key metrics to be included in the Navy OA 
program. 
The PEO IWS OA program has fielded an Engineering Development Model 
(EDM), the first of which is an open Aegis system that runs on the OACE and contains 
selected common and specialized warfighting services and applications. The notional 
EDM open system architecture illustration (Figure 16) defines the relationships between 











In addition, the Navy OA program will take advantage of other Navys, and 
services, and OA initiatives that have been pioneered in several Naval Departments such 
as the Virginia (SSN 774) class nuclear-powered attack submarine program and Acoustic 
Raid COTS Insertion (A-RCI). 
Summary:  A solid FORCEnet OA implementation strategy has been laid out 
over the course of the last several years as shown in this literature review. Simple, easy to 
understand, well-defined system partitions and boundaries are essential for successful 
implementation. Interfaces must be based on established commercial practices and COTS 
hardware. The progress made in earlier efforts, in particular with respect to PEO IWS, 
will not be repeated in this project. The intent is to build off what has been done to date in 
the development of specific engagement scenarios, and to revise the PEO IWS OA 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A.  CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BATTLE SPACE 
The basic operational concept of FORCEnet Open Architecture (Fn/OA) is to pair 
threats with ideal weapons using all available sensors and assets from platforms operating 
within the Battle Force network. As originally illustrated in the Three Realms of Battle 
Force Information (Figure 12), this pairing of targets and weapons will occur in three 
different time domains: the COP, CTP, and the FCP. Each time domain is a subset of the 
higher level as shown in a mockup of a SIAP in Figure 17. The COP is the situational 
awareness view at the Commander-In-Chief (CINC) level. "The CTP is a clear, 
consistent, and intuitively obvious display of all Real-World Objects (RWOs) of interest 
to users across the force within an operator selectable region of interest” (Luessen, 2003). 
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The FCP is the platform-centric situational awareness view that may be shared 
among others in the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or the Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG). Tracks can be obtained from one or more platforms, and cued to other platforms 
within the ESG or CSG. The track will receive Combat Identification (CID), and will be 
labeled unknown, assumed friend, friend, suspect, hostile, or assumed hostile. All CID 
tracks will eventually reside in all three domains. The sensing platform will place the 
track in the FCP.  After CID, the track may be cued to other platforms within the group, 
or may be added to the CTP through the Local Area Network (LAN). Finally, the CID 
track will be added to the COP using legacy systems such as Global Command and 
Control System Maritime (GCCS-M), Link 11, Link 16, Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC), Wide Area Network (WAN) or with new systems such as the Global 
Information Grid (GIG). 
Threats will be evaluated and strategies established based on functionality 
available on all platforms within the CTP. Threats will be prioritized based on the present 
situational awareness and the predicted enemy COA. The system will then assess the 
environment and warfighting resources available, and match the resources to the 
prioritized threat (Young, 2004). More than one platform may be involved in an 
engagement including both surface and air platforms. If an engagement is assigned to 
multiple platforms one of the following three techniques will be used to counter the threat 
(Young 2004): 
1) Engage on Remote (EOR) 
2) Forward Pass (FP) 
3) Remote Fire (RF)  
 
Process depictions and Functional Flow Block diagrams are provided below for each of 
the three selected mission concepts. 
1. Engagement Types 
a. Engage on Remote (EOR): Remote data is used to support all 
engagement phases of a locally launched missile. In this scenario, a remote platform 
passes tracking and engagement information to the local platform. The local platform 
 43
launches the weapon using non-organic sensor source data. The remote platform then 
supports the weapon throughout flight as necessary (command midcourse guidance or 
similar). If the weapon has an active seeker, it may switch to inertial midcourse guidance 
in-flight and finish in terminal guidance through intercept without support from either 
platform. An active weapon can switch between active and semi-active operation. Figure 
18 provides a depiction of the dynamics involved in this particular mission, while Figure 
19 provides the proposed Functional Flow Block Diagram.  
 
 








































































b. Forward Pass (FP): Control of an in-flight missile is handed off 
to another unit to complete the engagement against a threat. In this 
scenario, a platform launches a missile from local inventory using organic 
track data. The launching platform then passes control of the in-flight 
missile to another unit to support the engagement throughout the 
remainder of the flight. The unit taking control of the in-flight missile will 
support the engagement using command midcourse guidance or terminal 
guidance as required. Figure 20 provides a depiction of the dynamics 
involved in this particular mission, while Figure 21 provides the proposed 
Functional Flow Block Diagram.  
 
 





































































c.  Remote Fire (RF): A remote unit makes a missile launch decision and 
either the remote unit or local unit can support the in-flight missile until the 
engagement completes. The remote platform passes launch data and firing orders 
to the local platform. The local platform launches the weapon and then either 
supports the weapon throughout flight using command midcourse guidance or 
terminal homing phase as required. If the weapon has an active seeker, it may 
switch to inertial midcourse guidance in-flight and finish in terminal guidance 
through intercept without support from either platform. Figure 22 provides a 
depiction of the dynamics involved in this particular mission, while Figure 23 
provides the proposed Functional Flow Block Diagram.  
 







































































2. Enabling Capabilities Required: The following provides a list of the 
capabilities necessary to conduct the selected engagement scenarios: 
a.  Current Systems 
1) Aegis Cruiser and/or Destroyer with Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
capability. 
2) Advanced Hawkeye 
3) An active or semi-active weapon with command mid-course 
guidance, inertial midcourse guidance and link capability  that 
supports (IFC). 
4) Peer to peer communications network that supports Link 11, Link 
16, CEC, UHF, EHF, SHF, and HF. 
b.  Future Systems 
1) CG(X) and/or DD(X) with Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
2) An active or semi-active weapon with command mid-course 
guidance, inertial midcourse guidance and link capability that 
supports (IFC). 
3) Peer to peer communications network that supports Link 16, GIG, 
UHF, EHF, SHF, and HF. 
4) Advanced data fusion functionality 
B.  DESIGN PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
This project used the PEO IWS OA Domain Model along with “FORCEnet 
Implementation Strategy” (NRC 2005) as the initial starting point to begin the systems 
engineering process. It was determined early on in the process that FORCEnet system 
development was already beyond the concept development phase and required an 
unconventional approach. Various contractors and government activities have already 
settled on a high level operational architecture for the system; consequently this effort 
began at a point in the development cycle past the preparatory tasks laid out in The 
Engineering Design of Systems (Buede 2000). The project employed a top down 
approach by decomposing the IWS OA Domain Model, two levels, applying three 
specific detect-control-engage scenarios at the root levels, and recomposing the process 
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path to formulate a unique OA Domain Model in a bottom up approach. Specific system 
development activities were employed as follows: 
1) Original Problem Analysis and Reference Data Collection 
2) Layout Operational Views  
3) Requirements Analysis 
4) Requirements Allocation 
5) System Decomposition 
6) FFBD Development 
7) Simulation Model Development 
8) System Re-composition 
9) Comparison Analysis 
10) Compilation of Results 
11) Conclusions and Recommendations 
Once the original problem statement was reviewed and understood, Operational 
View (OV) diagrams were developed for each specific scenario. These OVs are provided 
in Appendix A. System decomposition and requirements analysis were conducted in 
parallel. As the system was decomposed, derived requirements were identified and 
developed. With this, methods of system decomposition were sometimes altered and 
several iterations of both processes were required. 
1. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS: A general set of mission and 
originating requirements was provided in the original problem statement (Blanchard-
Fabrycky, 2000). As the system was decomposed, additional derived requirements were 






Integrated Fire Control (IFC) Scenarios 
  1) Engage on Remote (EoR) 
  2) Forward Pass (FP) 
 3) Remote Fire (RF) 
 
Requirements Common to All Scenarios: 
a) Firing Unit (FRU) receive Fire Control Quality (FCQ) data on threat 
from Remote Unit(s) (RUs). 
 b) Validate FCQ data, enable FRU to act. 
 c) Maintain Common Operational Picture (COP) of local tracks. 
 d) Develop Fire Control Solution (FCS) based on FCQ data. 
 e) Correlate FRU FCS with RU FCS. 
 f) Resolve differences between FRU and RU FCSs. 
 g) FRU override opposing FCS on authorization. 
 h) Approve engagement. 
 i) FRU and RU send, receive, and update weapons inventory. 
 j) FRU and/or RU send, receive, and update engagement status. 
 k) FRU and/or RU send, receive intercept information. 
 l) FRU, RU and Interceptor correlate illumination and link frequencies. 
 
Overarching Requirements: 
 a) Build common database algorithms to store widely shared information.  
 b) Implement standard use interfaces to access information; 
  
Scenario Specific Requirements: 
 Engage on Remote 
 a) FRU launch applicable weapon based on validated FCQ, correlated or 
 overridden FCS, and approved engagement. 
 b) FRU support Mid-Course Guidance (Link or Self Destruct Timer 
 Reset). 
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 c) FRU, RU or Interceptor provides target illumination. 
d) RU send intercept information. 
e) FRU receive intercept information. 
f) Update COP. 
  
 Forward Pass: 
a) FRU launch applicable weapon based on validated FCQ and approved 
engagement. 
b) FRU and RU acknowledge handoff. 
c) FRU and RU support portions or all of Mid-Course Guidance (Link or 
Self Destruct Timer Reset). 
d) RU or Interceptor provide target illumination. 
e) RU send intercept information. 
f) FRU receive intercept information. 
g) Update COP. 
 
 Remote Fire: 
 a) FRU launch applicable weapon on approved orders from RU. 
 b) RU support Mid-Course Guidance (Link or Self Destruct Timer Reset). 
 c) RU or Interceptor provide target illumination. 
 d) RU send intercept information. 
 e) FRU receive intercept information. 
 f) Update COP. 
 2. REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION: Requirements were allocated to the 
notional functional blocks of the IWS OA Domain Model. This task was 
undertaken with the knowledge that the allocation may change once the 
decomposition was complete, FFBDs were developed and simulation results made 




SEARCH and DETECT (S/D) [1] 
DESCRIPTION: The S/D functional component will utilize local sensors to 
detect contacts. Sensor track positional reports and INTEL reports will be 
distributed over the LAN for other users. S/D will accept track cues from other 
remote units and task local sensors to search and detect for possible threats.  
INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 2 and 6. 
OUTPUTS: Sensor track and INTEL positional reports 
REQUIREMENTS: 
1.  Each Force-Net unit shall make local sensor data available to other 
units in near real time accuracy. 
2.  Each Force-Net unit shall make INTEL data available to other units in 
near real time accuracy. 
3. Use Intel sources and other sensor information to provide tracking cues 
to remote surveillance sensors. 
4. Accept tracking cues from remote units. 
5. FRU shall support Mid-Course Guidance (Link or Self Destruct Timer 
Reset). 
6. FRU, RU or Interceptor shall provide target illumination 
 
DATA INFORMATION SERVICES (D/S) [2] 
DESCRIPTION: The D/S functional component will maintain all time-critical 
system track data for real time (RT) and non-real time (NRT) tracks, including 
kinematics, identification, class, Link-Track Number, and primary and 
secondary source information. D/S will distribute time critical track data over 
LAN for other users.  
INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 1, 3, and 6 
OUTPUTS: Track Attribute data. 
REQUIREMENTS: Track parametric data 
1. Implement common processes for guidance computation and 
engagement control 
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2. Ensure participation and coordination of multiple non-collocated 
warfare assets 
3. Store and maintain common system track data (RT and NRT), 
including best and supporting sources in near real-time accuracy. 
4. Perform sensor tasking based on shared knowledge of battle space, 
including knowing capabilities and locations of all participating sensors 
5. Classify tracks based on IFF and INTEL data. 
6. RU shall send intercept information 
7. Shall update COP. 
 
PLANNING ASSESSMENT and DECISION (PAD) [3] 
DESCRIPTION: The PAD functional component will direct execution of all 
of the various warfare areas, perform threat assessments, and accept Command 
and Control orders. 
INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 2, 4, 6, and 8. 
OUTPUTS: C2 event and mission planning 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Provide for automated best resource selection decisions to select the 
best shooter. 
2. Provide for automated best resource selection decisions to predict 
which sensors can best generate fire control quality data throughout 
engagement. 
3. Provide for automated best resource selection to determine which units 
are capable of accepting control of an engagement after launch to enable 
forward pass. 
4. Develop fire control solutions from FCQ data and information provided 
by one or more non-organic sensor sources. 
5. System shall correlate FRU FCS with RU FCS. 
6. Allow for FRU over-ride opposing FCS on authorization. 
7. System shall approve or disapprove remote engagements. 
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8. FRU and/or RU shall send, receive, and update engagement status 
9. FRU, RU and Interceptor shall correlate illumination and link 
frequencies. 
 
WEAPON ASSET SERVICES [4] 
DESCRIPTION: controls and coordinates all shipboard and shipboard-
controlled assets included in the mission execution block 
INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 2, 3, 5, and 6 
OUTPUTS: Weapons scheduling 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Defend against significant number of aerospace targets 
2. Support the manual selection and control of warfare assets during an 
engagement 
3. Direct distributed warfare resources in a collaborative manner 
4. Ensure participation and coordination of multiple non-collocated warfare 
assets 
5. Firing Unit (FRU) shall receive, process and maintain Fire Control 
Quality (FCQ) data on the threat from Remote Unit(s) (RUs). 
6. Firing Unit shall validate FCQ data. 
7. Firing Unit shall enable FRU to act on threat. 
8. FRU and RU shall send, receive, and update weapons inventory 
 
MISSION EXECUTION [5] 
DESCRIPTION: Maintains all weapons, remote vehicle, ship and 
communications assets. 
INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 4 and 8 
OUTPUTS: Status of ship assets and equipment 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Ensure participation and coordination of multiple non-collocated 
warfare assets 
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2. Provide mid-course guidance to interceptors by units other than the 
launching unit 
3. Conduct engagements based on fire control solutions from information 
provided by one or more non-organic sensor sources 
4. FRU and/or RU shall send, receive intercept information 
5. FRU shall launch applicable weapon(s) based on validated FCQ, 
correlated or overridden FCS, and approved engagement 
 
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS [6] 
DESCRIPTION: represents the link between the combat system and the 
various data sources within and external to Battle Force; responsible for 
sending/receiving track data, mission plans, intelligence to and from other units 
in the Battle Force. 
 INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 2, 3, 4, and 6 
OUTPUTS: Network formatted tracking and mission related data 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Transmit, Receive and Forward all data exchanged between Force Level 
and Unit Level. 
 
COMMON SERVICES [7] 
DESCRIPTION: represents all services within the Combat level, Unit or 
Battle Force Level that are common. 
 INPUTS: Accept data from all functional blocks 
OUTPUTS: Environment, Time, Intel database 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Share real-time target information and eliminate correlation errors 





FORCE PLANNING and COORDINATION [9] 
DESCRIPTION: Provides mission coordination at the Battle Force level; 
processes Force Orders; assesses the mission plan and provides re-planning as 
needed. 
 INPUTS: Accept data from functional blocks 6 
OUTPUTS: Force and Joint level mission schedules 
REQUIREMENTS:  
1. Provide mid-course guidance to interceptors using externally provided 
information 
3. DECOMPOSITION/RE-COMPOSITION: The decomposition and re-
composition process results in a unique OA Domain Model for comparison to the 
IWS OA Domain Model. Furthermore, the process facilitated in-depth analysis 
that provides observations, conclusions and suggestions that may be used in the 
future to develop the physical architecture for FORCEnet OA. The initial phase of 
this project utilized additional systems engineering processes as tools to aid in 
preliminary developmental efforts. These tools are identified below:   
 a) As described in Engineering Design of Systems (Buede, 1998), Integrated 
Definition for Function (IDEF) modeling was first employed for 
decomposition and is provided in Appendix C. A-0 External Systems diagram, 
and A0 First level decomposition proved to be useful as the analysis 
progressed, but were not used in the final result. 
b) Since all networks exchange data, the data context and data flow diagrams 
described in Process for System Architecture and Requirements Engineering 
(Hatley-Pirbhai, 2000) were developed and are provided in Appendix A. 
These diagrams also proved to be useful as the analysis progressed, but were 
not used in the final result. 
4.   SIMULATION MODELING: Since FORCEnet is a system of data 
flows between Battle Force platforms, the problem statement should address 
concerns over data latency between the data distribution levels within the Fire 
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Control, Tactical, and Common Operational Pictures (Figure 17). Furthermore, 
there is concern that allocated system bandwidth will ensure time critical data 
rates are achieved. This is critical to proper system performance. Queuing 
processes must also be monitored during periods when the system is heavily 
loaded to avoid gridlock. Individual platform connectivity to the system will also 
impact performance. The system must degrade gracefully when and if platforms 
drop off the network and remain stable as platforms reconnect. Simulating a 
functioning operational system using a computer-generated model allows the 
actual system to be evaluated based on various data flow rates as well as gridlock 
and connectivity concerns. A commercially available simulation software 
application, Arena®, was used to validate the system design, and evaluate the 
impact of design parameter variation. 
C.  CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
1.  Functional Flow Block Diagrams 
The design principles (Section II) used for EoR, FP, and RF scenario development 
are based on detailed first and second level decompositions that identify each sub-
function that is required to conduct an engagement. These detailed first level FFBDs are 
shown again below. Each of the three scenarios are described in Section II. Analysis of 
the resulting individual FFBDs identify similar sub-functions that could be for any of the 
three scenarios. From a data processing and data fusion perspective, all three scenarios 
will process in a similar fashion. Differences in processing will arise when determining 
what platform will perform what function. In the detect-control-engage sequence, 
multiple platforms may be qualified to perform any one of these three functions, and 
multiple handoffs could be made as the Fire Control, Common Tactical, and Common 
Operational Pictures update. Processing and assigning would be handled separately, and 
updated frequently as changes in the battle space continuum occur. An in-flight weapon 
is particularly flexible when operating in inertial (autonomous) midcourse mode rather 
than command midcourse mode, and could be easily handed off to various platforms 
operating in the battle space. This flexibility is captured in the sub-function FFBDs 














Figure 24.    






































4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
 60
 




















































Figure 30.    
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Figure 36 Support Engagemen 
t 


































Conceptual Design Sub-Function FFBDs (Continued) 
 













































2.  Modeling 
Using a unique methodology, the project provides the following:  
1) a characterization of the battle space  
2) a description of the design principles applied and  
3) a conceptual design.  
Computer simulations are used to demonstrate and/or test the functionality of 
either individual processes within a particular system or the entire system itself. In this 
project, the functional system architecture was generated utilizing the methods and 
techniques called out in Blanchard & Fabrycky’s systems engineering process 
(Blanchard-Fabrycky, 2000). A computer-based simulation program (Arena®) was then 
used to ensure that the overall system was applicable in real-world scenarios. The result 
was a “system-independent” simulation model containing a representation of each major 
process within our Open Architecture Domain. 
The conceptual design is then modeled using ARENA® simulation software in an 
attempt to validate the proposed architecture. The FFBDs were used at all three levels as 
a direct reference for the simulation model. The model simulates data queuing at the 
platform level as well as at the fire control, tactical, and common operational picture level 
The simulation model will vary bandwidth and system loading to evaluate data latency 
concerns, system performance, and data gridlock. The parameters used to setup the model 
are provided in Appendix B. 
The simulation model was developed to represent one CSG or one ESG with call 
for fire coming in from littoral areas. It was not meant to simulate very large battle space 
with multiple hubs and points of commend. Figure 38 provides a top-level representation 
of the Arena® simulation model. The model is comprised of a total of 127 Process 
Blocks: 14 Top-Level, 53 Secondary, 53 Tertiary, 5 Decide Blocks, 1 Create Block, and 
1 Dispose Block. In addition, the model utilizes one return loop to allow for target 
reengagement in the event that the first interceptor does not defeat the threat. The 
Tertiary-Level Process Blocks were created to represent the lower level of functions 
required for the overall functionality of the system. These process blocks are described in 
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Appendix B. The model utilizes one return loop to allow for target reengagement in the 
event that the first interceptor does not defeat the threat. 
Each of the process blocks utilizes a timing parameter representing the minimum, 
most likely, and maximum time that the functions occur.  In order to prevent the model 
from becoming classified, only a conservative estimate of each timing parameter was 
utilized.  In the case of this model, adding more process steps increases the amount of 
conservative error within the steps, thus increasing overall modeling inaccuracy.  The 
model created validates the overall process but does not represent the level of complexity 
needed to accurately model the system at the component level. 
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IV.  RESULTS 
A. FORCENET OA DIAGRAMS 
 The FFBD composition resulted in two high-level FORCEnet OA diagrams that 
did not differ substantially from the PEO IWS model, used during initial project 
development. Although the differences are not highly significant, performing the top 
down, then bottom up decomposition and re-composition provided practical insight to the 
problem at hand and resulted in a set of conclusions and recommendations. Figure 39 
provides a diagram describing the transition between the two models. The text that 
follows describes the similarities and differences illustrated in Figure 39. The resulting 
re-composed FORCEnet OA diagrams are then provided in Figures 40 and 41. In order to 
more clearly explain the results, the model was separated into two diagrams representing 
both the functional and system domains. 
1. Modeling Technique: The PEO IWS FORCEnet Model indicates 
physical groupings of system components in two ways: 
• Functional groupings based on traditional hardware boundaries 
• Notional data flows based on experience with current and legacy 
systems 
The FORCEnet OA model developed in this project is based primarily on 
functional flow composition and decomposition. This method of system analysis 
differs substantially from traditional data flow and hardware boundary based 
analysis tools and those based on existing commercial Information Technology 
(IT) systems. This modeling technique allowed the consideration of two diagrams 
rather than just one during analysis: 
Functional Architecture  
• Sensor management 
• Threat/track management 
• Data fusion/data processing 
• Weapon management 
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System Domain Architecture  
• Prioritized data exchange 
• Data inventory and control 
• Reporting 
 
This separation allowed for greater detail in developing the OA domain, 
and allowed insight into potential solutions to the problem of developing 
FORCEnet OA based on actual implementation of RL, FP and EOR. Language 
used for levels of information exchange introduced earlier for COP, CTP and FCP 
will sometimes very between the field activities and their respective contractors. 
In this project's FORCEnet OA diagrams, the following terms are used 
interchangeably:  
a. G1 – Common Operational Picture 
b. G2 – Common Tactical Picture 















































































Figure 41.   Transition of PEO IWS OA to FORCEnet Model 
(continued) 
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2. PEO IWS FORCEnet Model and FORCEnet OA Model Similarities: 
The following functions remained very similar between the two models. The 
minor differences are noted in the descriptions below. Since the FORCEnet OA 
model composition created two diagrams rather than one, the primary similarities 
are most evident comparing the PEO IWS FORCEnet Model to the FORCEnet 
OA system domain model rather than the functional model. The functional model 
provides additional detail of what functions are required in each category of the 
system domain. The following describe the similar functional groupings: 
 
a) Search and Detect: This functional block remained almost 
identical with one exception. The track requires some level of immediate 
identification so that it can be added to the network for correlation to 
tracks on other platforms. In order to insure effective reaction time, initial 
tracks cannot wait for the complete combat identification process before 
being added to the network. 
 
b) Data Information Services: This functional grouping also 
remained very similar with the following two exceptions: 
1) Complete track ID attributes (or full combat ID) was placed 
within this functional group rather than in Planning, Assessment 
and Decision. Identification attributes must be assigned sooner 
within the OODA loop to aid in reaction time. 
2) Move the sensor scheduler to planning, assessment and 
decision where the evolving COP, CTP, and FCP are managed.  
 
c) Planning, Assessment and Decision: This functional grouping 
remained very similar to the PEO IWS model but with the following three 
added functions: 
1) Add sensor scheduler moved from data information 
services 
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2) Data fusion opportunity 
3) Command and Control and decision-making 
 
d) Mission Execution: The primary tasks of this functional block 
remain the same with some minor tasks added: 
1) Inventory Update 
2) Midcourse Guidance 
3) Kill Assessment 
4) Compile and disseminate inventory data 
 
3. PEO IWS FORCEnet Model and FORCEnet OA Model Differences: 
 As outlined above, the FORCEnet OA system domain model has more in 
common with the PEO IWS model, while the FORCEnet OA functional model 
presented major differences. These differences have been categorized and may be 
described as follows:  
a) Weapon Assets and Services Eliminated: This functional 
category was completely eliminated primarily based on its functions being 
moved to other functional areas: 
1) Action receipt was moved to planning and assessment in 
order to increase reaction time. The system will immediately take 
action on assigned missions. 
2) Scheduling was moved to planning and assessment in order 
to make a decision and immediately schedule and add status to 
the network. This incorporates sensors input as part of an overall 
planning, assessment and decision-making.  It also eliminates the 
possible network data traffic congestion since processing power 
requirement is no longer an issue (dual cores, quad cores, etc.). 
 3) Event was moved to EXCOMM in order to update the COP 
and CTP in parallel with taking action in mission execution 
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b) Force Planning and Coordination Eliminated: Joint Battle Force 
Orders (JBFO) and Battle Group Orders (BGO) will be broadcast to all 
platforms simultaneously. The orders will be processed through common 
services and received via EXCOMM. Each platform will use this 
information dependent on their view and involvement in the battle space.  
c) EXCOMM Considerably Expanded – EXCOMM has the same 
system domain physical hardware function as the original PEO IWS 
model. It remains manager of networks, radio, and satellite 
communications. These functions are managed so that, based on the best 
data rate that the system is actually experiencing, there is reasonable data 
flow to the CTP and COP. Without monitoring and managing data flow, 
and choosing alternative network paths or communication vehicles, data 
flow disruptions could potentially cripple the system. Although initial 
dominance of the battle space may be achieved, maintenance of that 
domination may be suspect based on network problems, gridlock, or 
singular data paths. The role of EXCOMM, therefore, has expanded to 
assume the “event status” of weapon/asset services and integrates more 
directly with common services. EXCOMM will call on various 
communication paths dependent on data priority and security requirements 
for FCS transmission, track/threat updates, and direct receipt of 
intelligence data. The FCP, CTP and COP are constantly evolving, and 
FORCEnet must react in both a time constrained manner, dependent on 
threat priority, and in a command and control manner to update the CTP 
and COP based on updates from kill assessments, data fusion, sensor 
reassignment, and platforms joining and exiting the battle space. 
EXCOMM must also coordinate with other system functions to update 
data tags such as timing, type, and track quality prior to transmission or 
adding this data to the network. Working with common services, 
EXCOMM will need to compensate for network loading, choose alternate 
data paths based on data priority and FCP urgency. Networks will slow or 
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crash, and EXCOMM, in conjunction with common services, will be 
required to not only manage down times and alternative paths, but 
anticipate slowing data rates due to system loading and react. 
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Figure 43.   Revised FORCEnet OA System Domain Model
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B. SIMULATION MODEL RESULTS 












          
G1.1 Peer-to-Peer 
Threat Track 
Info Relay Threat Info FCP 
          
G1.2 Peer-to-Peer FCS Relay FCS Info FCP 
          
G1.3 Peer-to-Peer Schedule Info Schedule Sensor/Weapon FCP 
          
G1.4 Peer-to-Peer 
Firing 
Commands Relay FCS Info FCP 
          
G1.5 Peer-to-Peer Inventory Data Relay Inventory Info FCP/CTP 
          
G1.6 Peer-to-Peer 
Engagement 
Data Relay Inventory Info FCP 
          
G2.1 Broadcast Inventory Data Relay Inventory Info CTP 
          
G3.1 Broadcast All Data 
Monitor and Report All 
Data COP 
          
Table 1.    Data Packet Assignments 
 
Table 2 below displays the results collected from the ARENA model using the 
individual process timing parameters provided in the Appendix.  The total number of 
incoming threats, the interval between each set of incoming threats, and the percentage of 
successful initial engagements was varied for each of the eight model runs.  For each 

















        





























1 60 90 0.5166 25.1135 "ID the Threat" 0.3694 "Establish a Track" 0.2561
1 60 100 0.4974 23.4344 "ID the Threat" 0.3551 "Establish a Track" 0.2648





1 30 100 1.2033 32.1173 "ID the Threat" 0.8961 "Establish a Track" 0.4846





















Based on the results outlined in Table 2, the following observations were made: 
- As the number of incoming threats was increased from 1 to 2, the 
average total system time more than doubles while the system 
saturation increases four-fold. 
- Going from 30 to 60 second long threat interval time increases both 
the average total system time and system saturation by 2.5 times. 
- Reengaging 10% of the time means about a 5-10% increase in average 
total system time with a slight increase in system saturation. 
- Key drivers of system saturation are 1) number of incoming threats 
and 2) threat interval. 
Limiting factor tends to vary.  For a single incoming threat, “ID the Threat” is the 
primary driver while “Establish a Track” is the secondary driver. For two incoming 
threats, "Transmit All Data" is the primary driver while "Compile Inventory Data" is the 
secondary driver.  In both cases, the OA communication tends to get saturated but not the 
actual threat engagement. 
Using this computer-based simulation model, the following two results were 
considered significant: 
 
1. Validation of the model structure. The model verified that the proposed system 
possessed a logical flow with no apparent lapses while addressing the 
functionality requirements for each of the three threat engagement scenarios. The 
lowest level process blocks within the model form a chain of components that 
resemble a logical flow. This portion of the model demonstrates an adequate level 
of functionality with no unnecessary redundancy or unrealistic steps. 
 
2. Validation of system timing.  The model was modified so that each of the 
various sub-models closely represented actual ship system elements whenever 
possible. This was accomplished by defining both a specific system resource and 
its associated timing parameters within each of the lowest level process modules. 
With the use of timing parameters, it was determined that there were no excessive 
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bottlenecks within the proposed system. A more accurate representation may be 
created through the use of actual shipboard timing parameters. This model could 
then be used in simulation testing, statistical analysis, and for future process 
improvements (e.g., Lean, six sigma, and theory of constraints). 
 
Additional benefits may come from the use of an advanced computer-based 
simulation application, one that includes the ability to readily display a tactical 
representation of the integrated systems in a simulated operational environment. During 
simulation events many scenarios may be run and large amounts of data extracted in 
order to attain a high confidence level of systems performance prior to finalized design. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis performed for this research project has exposed potential functional 
boundary limitations in the currently proposed PEO IWS OA Functional Domain model 
as presented, and a revised OA Functional Domain model has been offered for 
consideration.  Through simulation development, test execution and the use of systems 
engineering techniques, this re-structured model has been evaluated and appears to satisfy 
OA and FORCEnet requirements for the specific Mission Capability Packages examined.  
This model and its simulation component do bear further scrutiny and refinement to 
ensure the processes and their attributes are properly characterized.  The recommendation 
is for this review to be performed by Engagement or FORCEnet Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) who could provide constructive feedback regarding the level of accuracy and 
realism contained therein. Additional benefits may be gained from expanding the 
Simulation model to increase the number of FORCEnet platform participants so as to 
determine the point at which the OA model becomes inefficient and/or ineffective.  OA 
specifications and system boundary descriptions will eventually attain capacity levels 
with respect to data flow.  This point of diminishing return relative to battle space size 
should be identified, realized, and modeled.  It is the hope and expectation that the work 
performed in support of this thesis may be partially or fully adopted by future research 
projects to further develop, test and validate the feasibility of additional FORCEnet 
mission requirements operating within the Open Architecture functional construct.      
Research efforts have demonstrated that across the Navy Enterprise, FORCEnet 
viability, affordability, and sustenance necessitates an architecture that is in full 
compliance with Open Architecture technology, systems and standards. The continued 
presence of legacy and non-OA computer and operational systems within the FORCEnet 
construct will only prevent FORCEnet-wide Combat System enhancements from being 
beneficial to all force-level participants.  Service-specific acquisition projects will 
continue to limit and constrain efforts to enable Joint Coordination and establish effective 
Battle Space management in support of the Navy’s Sea-Power 21 and Single Integrated 
Air Picture initiatives.  To successfully combat the more challenging threats of the 21st 
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century, current and future warfighting capabilities demand a full adoption of OA 
standards and infrastructure.  We believe that the OA functional assessment and model 
validation provided herein gives credence to the belief that the development and 
embedding of Open Architecture within FORCEnet will result in a superior, adaptive, 
“plug and fight” capability for the modern war-fighter of today and tomorrow. 
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Figure A-1: OV-1 IFC Scenario Operational Concept (PEO IWS, 2006) 
 
 
The Integrated Fire Control (IFC) High Level Operational Concept (OV-1) 
provides a high-level illustration of the mission, highlighting the main operational nodes 
involved and the unique operational aspects of intended environment. The OV-1 is a 
pictorial representation of the expected interactions between the systems and their 
environment. Its primary purpose is to facilitate communications between the warfighters 








































The purpose of the OV-1 Engaged on Remote (EOR) diagram is to depict the 
engagement of a threat where a remote unit provides the Fire Control Quality threat data 
to the Firing Unit platform. Using this remote data, the Firing Unit launches an 



























1) Remote unit provides fire control 
quality threat data 
2) Firing unit launches interceptor based 
on remote threat data
3) Firing unit continues to control 
engagement (compute and provide 
interceptor guidance, etc.) based on 
remote data




Figure A-3: OV-1 Remote Fire Scenario Operational Concept 
 
The purpose of the OV-1 Forward Pass diagram is to provide a graphical 
representation of a scenario where the control of an in-flight missile is handed off to 
another equally capable unit to complete the intercept. The Firing Unit launches 
interceptor then transfers the remainder of engagement prosecution to remote unit. 












































1) Both ships maintain fire control quality 
threat data 
2) Remote unit provides launch data and 
firing order to firing unit
3) Firing unit launches interceptor
4) Either remote or firing unit can control 
engagement (compute and provide 







Figure A-4: OV-1 Remote Fire Scenario Operational Concept 
 
 
The purpose of the OV-1 Remote Fire diagram is to provide a graphical 
representation of a scenario where the control of an in-flight missile is handled by another 
equally capable unit to complete the intercept. The Firing Unit provides launch of the 
interceptor only. Essentially, the Remote Unit launches the weapon, but the local unit 
provides the FCS and supports the interceptor in-flight. If the interceptor has its own on-
board illuminator, it may fly autonomously to the target. 
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EOR OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS AND SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS 
  
The remote unit will sense threat information and transfer it to the firing unit. The remote 
unit will transmit a firing request to the firing unit. The firing unit will then use the 
remote threat data to launch an interceptor. The remote unit will continue to control the 












































































Figure A-6: EOR Operational Sequence Diagram #1 
 
W/ASPADDISS/DOperator MEEXCOMFP/C








amplifying data (TN, ID, 
threat assessment, etc.)
IFC Status (radars, missiles, launcher)
RU IFC Status 
(radars, missiles, 
launcher)
Local Radar Tracks (TN, position, kinematics)
RU IFCl Status (radars, missiles, launcher)
O/S IFC Status 
(radars, missiles, 
launcher)
RU Radar Track 
Data
RU Radar Track Data (TN, kinematics, ID, Threat, etc.)
O/S Radar Tracks


































Figure A-7: EOR Operational Sequence Diagram #2 
W /A SP A DD ISS /DO p e ra to r M EE X C O MF P /C
IF C  C o m m a n d  (O /S  M o d e  =  a u to m a tic )
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  (O /S  M o d e  =  a u to m a tic )O /S  IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  
(M o d e  =  a u to m a tic )
R U  E n g a g e  O rd e r (T N , 
F R U , W e a p o n  =  M iss ile )
R U  E n g a g e  O rd e r (T N , F R U , W e a p o n  =  M iss ile )
C a lcu la te  
F C  S o lu tio n
E n g a g e m e n t S ta tu s  (T N , W e a p o n , P re d ic te d  In te rce p t P o in t, e tc .)
T ra ck  D a ta  R e q u e s t (T N )
T ra ck  D a ta  
R e q u e s t R e sp o n se  (T N , k in e m a tics )
E n g a g e m e n t O rd e r R e sp o n se  (T N , W e a p o n , W IL C O )
E n g a g e  O rd e r 
(T N , F R U , W e a p o n )
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  
(F C  ra d a r, la u n ch e r, 
m iss ile  s ta tu s )
S ch e d u le  
E n g a g m e n t 
A sse tsL o ca l F C  R a d a r S u p p o rt O rd e rs  (M id co u rse  G u id a n ce  O rd e rs , 
T e rm in a l P h a se  O rd e rs , co m m s fre q  e tc .)
R U  F C  R a d a r S u p p o rt O rd e rs  (M id co u rse  G u id a n ce  O rd e rs , T e rm in a l P h a se  O rd e rs , co m m s fre q , e tc .)
F ire  O rd e r (a im  p o in t, 
co m m s fre q , tim e  o f 
la u n ch )
L a u n ch e r S ta tu s
( M iss ile  F ire d , 
M iss ile  ID )
M iss ile  S ta tu s  (k ie n e m a tics , s ta tu s , e tc .)
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  (M iss ile  F ire d , M iss ile  ID )
M iss ile  S ta tu s  (p o s itio n , k ie n e m a tics , s ta tu s , e tc .)M iss ile  S ta tu s  (p o s itio n , k ie n e m a tics , s ta tu s , e tc .)
O /S  E n g a g e m e n t O rd e r 
R e sp o n se  (T N , 
W e a p o n , W IL C O )
O /S  E n g a g e m e n t S ta tu s  
(T N , W e a p o n , P re d ic te d  
In te rce p t P o in t, e tc .)
R U  F C  R a d a r S u p p o rt 
O rd e rs  (M id co u rse  
G u id a n ce  O rd e rs , 
T e rm in a l P h a se  
O rd e rs , co m m s fre q , 
e tc .)
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  
(M iss ile  F ire d , 
































Figure A-8: EOR Operational Sequence Diagram #3 
W /A SP A DD ISS /DO p e r a to r M EE X C O MF P /C
R e - C a lc u la te  
F C  S o lu t io n
L o c a l  F C  R a d a r  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s  ( M is s i le  ID ,  
P o s i t io n ,  M id c o u r s e  G u id a n c e  a n d /o r  T e r m in a l  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s ,  e t c . )
R U  F C  R a d a r  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s  ( M is s i le  ID ,  
P o s i t io n ,  M id c o u r s e  G u id a n c e  a n d /o r  T e r m in a l  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s ,  e t c . )
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  ( p r e d ic t e d  in te r c e p t  p o in t ,  
m id c o u r s e  g u id a n c e ,  e t c . )  
L o c a l  F C  R a d a r  S ta tu s  ( s e a r c h in g ,  lo c k e d  o n ,  e t c . )
R U  F C  R a d a r  S ta tu s  ( s e a r c h in g ,  lo c k e d  o n ,  e tc . )
R e q u e s t  T a r g e t  /  M is s i le  
T r a c k  D a ta
T a r g e t  /  M is s i le  
T r a c k  D a ta
O /S  K i l l  /  S u r v iv e  A s s e s m e n t
K i l l  /  S u r v iv e
A s s e s m e n t
C a n c e l  L o c a l  C u r r e n t  /  P e n d in g  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s
IF C  S ta tu s  U p d a te  
( p r e d ic te d  in t e r c e p t  
p o in t ,  m id c o u r s e  
g u id a n c e ,  e t c . )  
R U  F C  R a d a r  S u p p o r t  
O r d e r s  ( M is s i le  ID ,  
P o s i t io n ,  M id c o u r s e  
G u id a n c e  a n d /o r  
T e r m in a l  S u p p o r t  
O r d e r s ,  e t c . )
R U  F C  R a d a r  S ta tu s  
( s e a r c h in g ,  lo c k e d  o n ,  
e t c . )
O /S  K i l l  /  S u r v iv e  
A s s e s s m e n t
C a n c e l  R U  C u r r e n t  /  P e n d in g  S u p p o r t  O r d e r s
C a n c e l  R U  C u r r e n t  /  
P e n d in g  S u p p o r t  
O r d e r s
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APPENDIX B.  ARENA® SIMULATION MODEL 
Appendix B is divided into two parts, section A-1 describes each of the process blocks 
within the model, and section A-2 describes the parameters used to develop the model in 
a spreadsheet. 
 
A-1  ARENA MODEL PROCESS BLOCK DESCRIPTIONS 
 
I) Incoming Threat – Represents the threats entering the Naval Battle Group 
operational area.  This includes threats entering into the individual operational 
area of any one ship within the Battle Group as well as the overall operational 
area established by the Battle Group Commander. 
 
II) Detect Threat – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes which 
represent a ship’s ability to manage incoming threats.  The lower-level 
processes contained within this sub-model are as follows: 
a. ID Threat – Threat is identified as entering into a ship’s operational area. 
b. Select Preferred Sensor – Ship allocates a preferred sensor to handle the 
tracking duties for the particular threat(s). 
c. Establish Track – A solid track of the threat is established. 
d. Verify Threat and Intel – Using pre-gathered intelligence information, the 
ship verifies whether the threat is actually a known threat or if the threat is 
actually a friendly force. 
e. Update Network – The ship updates the network with information 
regarding the threat. 
f. Determine Engagement Solution – The ship determines how to proceed in 
engaging the threat. 
 
III) Will Detecting Ship Determine FCS? – Decision block determining whether 




(FCS) for engaging the threat or 2) pass along the duty of determining the 
FCS to another ship.  If the ship which detected the threat will determine the 
FCS, the next step will be to proceed to “Determine FCS.”  If the duty of 
determining the FCS is to be passed to another ship, the next step will be to 
proceed to “Relay Threat Info.” 
 
IV) Relay Threat Info – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes 
which represent the act of a ship in relaying track data of a threat to another 
ship.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-model are as 
follows: 
a. Compile Data – The threat track data is gathered into an electronic packet 
of information suitable for transmission. 
b. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of threat track data is transmitted to 
another ship. 
c. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ship. 
 
V) Determine FCS – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes 
which represent the act of a ship in determining the proper FCS for engaging 
the threat.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-model are as 
follows: 
a. Request G1 Data – Ship determining the FCS requests all known threat 
data from the G1 high-speed data line. 
b. Gather G1 Data – Ship determining the FCS gathers the threat data 
received from the G1 high-speed data line. 
c. Apply Engagement Doctrine – Ship compares parameters of threat to pre-
set ship engagement doctrine. 
d. Formulate Solution – Ship formulates a solution based on the results 





VI) Will FCS Ship Coordinate Assets? – Decision block determining whether 
the ship which determined the FCS will 1) coordinate the assets necessary for 
engaging the threat or 2) pass along the duty of coordinate the assets 
necessary for engaging the threat to another ship.  If the ship which 
determined the FCS will coordinate the assets necessary for engaging the 
threat, the next step will be to proceed to “Coordinate Assets.”  If the duty of 
coordinate the assets necessary for engaging the threat is to be passed to 
another ship, the next step will be to proceed to “Relay FCS Info.” 
 
VII) Relay FCS Info – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes 
which represent the act of a ship in relaying FCS info to another ship.  The 
lower-level processes contained within this sub-model are as followed: 
a. Compile Data – The FCS info is gathered into an electronic packet of 
information suitable for transmission. 
b. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of FCS info is transmitted to another 
ship. 
c. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ship. 
 
VIII) Coordinate Assets – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes 
which represent the act of a ship in coordinating the assets necessary for 
engaging the threat.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-
model are as followed: 
a. Gather G1 Data – Ship responsible for coordinating the assets necessary 
for engaging the threat gathers all known threat data from the G1 high-
speed data line. 
b. Select Weapon Type – The appropriate weapon type is selected based on 
the Engagement Doctrine. 





d. Select Ship for Weapon Use – A ship which can provide the necessary 
intercept weapon is selected. 
e. Relay Info to Supporting Ship – If a supporting ship was established, then 
asset info is relayed to that ship. 
 
IX) Schedule Sensor and/or Weapon – Top-level sub-model containing lower-
level processes which represent the act of a ship in scheduling a sensor and/or 
weapon necessary for engaging the threat.  The lower-level processes 
contained within this sub-model are as follows: 
a. Contact Threat Tracking Ship – The ship responsible for tracking the 
threat is contacted. 
b. Contact Firing Ship – The ship responsible for firing the asset is contacted. 
c. Prepare Weapon – The intercept weapon is initially prepared for launch. 
 
X) Will Scheduling Ship Fire Weapon? – Decision block determining whether 
the ship which scheduled the sensor and/or weapon necessary for engaging the 
threat will 1) fire the intercept weapon or 2) pass along the duty of firing the 
intercept weapon to another ship.  If the ship which scheduled the sensor 
and/or weapon necessary for engaging the threat will fire the intercept 
weapon, the next step will be to proceed to “Fire Weapon.”  If the duty of 
firing the intercept weapon is to be passed to another ship, the next step will 
be to proceed to “Relay Firing Command Info.” 
 
XI) Relay Firing Command Info – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in relaying the firing command 
info to another ship.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-
model are as follows: 
a. Compile Data – The firing command info is gathered into an electronic 




b. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of the firing command info is 
transmitted to another ship. 
c. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ship. 
 
XII) Fire Weapon – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes which 
represent the act of a ship in firing the intercept weapon responsible for 
engaging the threat.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-
model are as followed: 
a. Provide Shipboard Power to Weapon – Ship responsible for firing the 
weapon provides shipboard power to the intercept asset. 
b. Provide Initialization Data to Weapon – Ship responsible for firing the 
weapon provides initialization power to the intercept asset. 
c. Activate Weapon Batteries – Ship responsible for firing the weapon 
removes shipboard power after providing the necessary command to 
activate the weapon batteries. 
d. Provide INTENT TO LAUNCH Command – Ship responsible for firing 
the weapon provides the final launch command necessary for release of 
the intercept asset. 
e. Assign Launch Status – A launch status is assigned to the intercept asset 
which marks it as a successful or unsuccessful weapon launch. 
f. Provide Weapon Status – Ship responsible for firing the weapon provides 
the weapon status (i.e. launch status). 
 
XIII) Manage Inventory – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level processes 
which represent the act of a ship in managing its weapon inventory.  The 
lower-level processes contained within this sub-model are as follows: 
a. Update Inventory of Firing Ship – The weapon inventory for the magazine 





b. Compile Data – The updated weapon inventory data is gathered into an 
electronic packet of information suitable for transmission. 
c. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of updated weapon inventory data is 
transmitted electronically to ship command and control. 
d. Verify Transmission – The ship verifies that the information packet was 
received within command and control. 
 
XIV) Relay Inventory Info – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in relaying its updated inventory 
info to all other ships.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-
model are as follows: 
a. Compile Data – The updated weapon inventory data is gathered into an 
electronic packet of information suitable for transmission. 
b. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of updated weapon inventory data is 
transmitted to the other ships within the battle group. 
c. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ships within the battle group. 
 
XV) Support Engagement – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in supporting the engagement of a 
threat by an intercept weapon.  The lower-level processes contained within 
this sub-model are as follows: 
a. Uplink Midcourse Guidance – The ship responsible for supporting the 
threat engagement uplinks to the intercept weapon and provides all 
necessary midcourse guidance commands. 
b. Direct/Schedule Sensor for Terminal Support – The ship responsible for 
supporting the threat engagement directs or schedules a sensor and 





XVI) Will Engaging Ship Evaluate the Engagement? – Decision block 
determining whether the ship responsible for engaging the threat will 1) 
evaluate the engagement or 2) pass along the duty of evaluating the 
engagement to another ship.  If the ship responsible for engaging the threat 
will evaluate the engagement, the next step will be to proceed to “Evaluate 
Engagement.”  If the ship responsible for engaging the threat will pass along 
the duty of evaluating the engagement to another ship, the next step will be to 
proceed to “Relay Engagement Data.” 
 
XVII) Relay Engagement Data – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in relaying engagement data to all 
other ships.  The lower-level processes contained within this sub-model are as 
follows: 
a. Compile Data – The engagement data is gathered into an electronic packet 
of information suitable for transmission. 
b. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of engagement data is transmitted to the 
other ships within the battle group. 
c. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ships within the battle group. 
 
XVIII) Evaluate Engagement – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in evaluating the engagement of a 
threat by an intercept weapon.  The lower-level processes contained within 
this sub-model are as follows: 
a. Validate Sensor Track Data – The sensor track data collected during the 
engagement of the threat is analyzed and validated. 
b. Perform Kill Assessment – A kill assessment is performed to determine if 
both the threat and the intercept weapon were destroyed. 





XIX) Threat Kill? – Decision block determining whether the threat was destroyed 
or not.  If the threat was destroyed, the next step will be to proceed to 
“Monitor and Report All Data.”  If the threat was not destroyed, the next step 
will be to proceed back to “Will Detecting Ship Determine FCS” to allow for 
a possible reengagement with another intercept weapon. 
 
XX) Monitor and Report All Data – Top-level sub-model containing lower-level 
processes which represent the act of a ship in monitoring and reporting all 
data from a previous threat engagement activity to all other ships.  The lower-
level processes contained within this sub-model are as follows: 
a. Compile Engagement Evaluation Data – Engagement evaluation data is 
gathered into an electronic packet of information suitable for transmission. 
b. Compile Inventory Data – Inventory data is gathered into an electronic 
packet of information suitable for transmission. 
c. Compile Asset Data – Intercept weapon data is gathered into an electronic 
packet of information suitable for transmission. 
d. Transmit Data – Electronic packet of engagement evaluation data, 
inventory data, and asset data is transmitted to the other ships within the 
battle group. 
e. Verify Transmission – The transmitting ship verifies that the information 
packet was received by the other ships within the battle group. 
 





A-2  MODEL PARAMETERS: The following table is an excerpt from the EXCEL® spreadsheet that defines the parameters 
used to develop the Arena® simulation model.  The table describes the setup for each process, and the statistical distribution 






























LEVEL 1ST LEVEL DOWN 2ND LEVEL DOWN PARAMETERS 
         





ARRIV First Creation 
Incoming 
Threat ----------------- ----------------- Random 10 Sec 2 Infinite 0.0 
         
  








TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
ID Threat ID the Threat_Process 0.1 0.15 0.25 Triang. sec V.A. 
Select Preferred Sensor Select a Preferred Sensor_Process 0.25 0.3 0.5 Triang. sec V.A. 
Establish Track Establish a Track_Process 0.25 0.5 1 Triang. sec V.A. 
Verify Threat and Intel Verify the Threat and Intel_Process 2 3 10 Triang. sec V.A. 
Update Network Update the Network_Process 2 3 5 Triang. sec V.A. 
Threat 
Detected 
Determine Engagment Solution 
Determine an Engagement 
Solution_Process 1 2 3 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
 
  TYPE 
Percent 
True     









    










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Data 1 Compile Data 1a 0.05 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 
Transmit Data 1 Transmit Data 1a 0.05 0.3 0.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Relay 
Threat Info 












































TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Request G1 Data Request G1 Data_Process 0.05 0.08 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Gather G1 Data Gather G1 Data_Process 0.05 0.08 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Apply Engagement Doctrine Apply Engagement Doctrine_Process 0.1 0.15 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
Determine 
FCS 
Formulate Solution Formulate Solution_Process 0.1 0.15 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
 
  TYPE 
Percent 
True     









    










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Data 2 Compile Data 2a 0.05 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 
Transmit Data 2 Transmit Data 2a 0.05 0.3 0.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Relay FCS 
Info 
Verify Transmission 2 Verify Transmission 2a 0.02 0.1 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Gather G1 Data_2 Gather G1 Data_2_Process 0.05 0.08 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Select Weapon Type Select Weapon Type_Process 0.05 0.08 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Select Ship for Sensor Track Select Ship for Sensor Track_Process 0.1 0.15 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
Select Ship for Weapon Use Select Ship for Weapon Use_Process 0.05 0.08 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Coordinate 
Assets 
Relay Info to Supporting Ship Relay Info to Supporting Ship_Process 0.5 1 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Contact Threat Tracking Ship Contact Threat Tracking Ship_Process 0.5 1 2 Triang. sec V.A. 








































  TYPE 
Percent 
True     









    










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Data 3 Compile Data 3a 0.05 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 




Info Verify Transmission 3 Verify Transmission 3a 0.02 0.1 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Provide Shipboard Power to Weapon Provide Shipboard Power to Weapon_Process 0.5 1 1.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Provide Initialization Data to Weapon Provide Initialization Data to Weapon_Process 0.4 0.5 0.7 Triang. sec V.A. 
Activate Weapon Batteries Activate Weapon Batteries_Process 1.5 2 3 Triang. sec V.A. 
Provide INTENT TO LAUNCH 
Command 
Provide INTENT TO LAUNCH 
Command_Process 0.05 0.1 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Assign Launch Status [Success = 1, Failure = 2] 0.05 0.1 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
Fire 
Weapon 
Provide Weapon Status Provide Weapon Status_Process 0.15 0.08 0.1 Triang. sec V.A. 










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Update Inventory of Firing Ship 
Update Inventory of Firing Ship 
Process_Process 0.1 0.2 0.35 Triang. sec V.A. 
Compile Data Compile Data Process_Process 0.06 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 
Transmit Data Transmit Data Process_Process 0.05 0.3 0.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Manage 
Inventory 
Verify Transmission Verify Transmission_Process 0.02 0.1 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 










TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Data 4 Compile Data 4a 0.05 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 
Transmit Data 4 Transmit Data 4a 0.05 0.3 0.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Relay 
Inventory 

































Table B-1, Arena Simulation Model Parameters (Continued) 
 
 






TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Uplink Midcourse Guidance Uplink Midcourse Guidance_Process 0.5 0.75 1.5 Triang. sec V.A. Support 
Engagement Direct Schedule Sensor for 
Terminal Support 
Direct Schedule Sensor for Terminal 
Support_Process 0.5 0.75 1.5 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
 
  TYPE 
Percent 
True     





----------------- ----------------- 2-way by Chance 85% 
    
         
 






TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Data 5 Compile Data 5a 0.05 0.1 0.15 Triang. sec V.A. 
Transmit Data 5 Transmit Data 5a 0.05 0.3 0.4 Triang. sec V.A. 
Relay 
Engagement 
Data Verify Transmission 5 Verify Transmission 5a 0.02 0.1 0.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
 






TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Validate Sensor Track Data Validate Sensor Track Data_Process 0.5 1 2 Triang. sec V.A. 
Perform Kill Assessment Perform Kill Assessment_Process 0.7 1 1.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
Evaluate 
Engagement 
Mark as Miss of Kill Mark as Miss of Kill_Process 0.05 0.1 0.12 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
 
  TYPE 
Percent 
True     






















Table B-1, Arena Simulation Model Parameters (Continued) 
 






TYPE UNITS ALLOCATION 
Compile Engagement 
Evaluation Data 
Compile Engagement Evaluation 
Data_Process 0.25 0.5 1 Triang. sec V.A. 
Compile Inventory Data Compile Inventory Data_Process 0.25 0.5 1 Triang. sec V.A. 
Compile Asset Data Compile Asset Data_Process 0.25 0.5 1 Triang. sec V.A. 




Verify Transmission_2 Verify Transmission_2_Process 0.7 1 1.2 Triang. sec V.A. 
         
   Record?      
     End Threat 
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APPENDIX C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were generated based on the top-level architecture of our 
group’s Arena simulation. 
1. All ships within the Battle Group will utilize the same algorithm (decentralized 
decision making). 
2. Back-up solution algorithm is included in each step (scheduling, firing, etc.) 
1. Processing power is not a limiting factor (Dual Core/Quad Core CPUs). 
2. Data fusion techniques used is independent of network data processing. 
3. The system is always functioning and in a ready state prior to engagement. 
4. Communication systems functioning and in a ready state prior to engagement. 
5. Combat systems will function as designed with no lapses in performance. 
6. Illumination is part of the Use/Scheduling sequence. 
7. There are no bandwidth limitations. 
8. Specific engagement objectives/thresholds have not been established. 
9. Threats are detected by ship radar, not from any other source. 
10. 90% of all threat detections are by the originating ship. 
11. 90% of all threat engagements are handled by the originating ship. 
12. The shortest time period to transmit data over the network at any data rate is 
greater than the longest system processing time for any ship system/component. 
13. No jamming in the surrounding environment. 
14. At least one ship within the Battle Group is capable of engaging the threat. 
15. The network is secure. 
16. All ships possess the necessary hardware and software to communicate with one 
another. 
17. Each ship possesses the necessary minimum requirements to support track threats, 
compute FCS, manage inventory data, engage threats, and process engagement 
data. 
18. Operational context groups will be based on incoming threat location with regards 
to battle group ship positions. 
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APPENDIX D.  GLOSSARY 
OACE The OACE is a set of loosely coupled software 
components based on open standards, interfaces, and 
services. The fundamental requirement for OACE is to 
provide a distributed real-time computing environment 
for Naval Combat Systems and Naval Weapons Systems 
elements. (From FORCEnet Technical Guide) 
Battle Force A standing operational naval task force organization of 
carriers, surface combatants, and submarines assigned to 




CID is the process of attaining an accurate 
characterization of detected objects in the joint battle 
space to the extent that high confidence, timely 
application of military options and weapons resources 
can occur.  Depending on the situation, this 
characterization may be limited to ‘friend’, ‘enemy’, or 
‘neutral’.  In other situations, other characterizations may 
be required – including, but not limited to, class, type, 
nationality, and mission configuration. (From JFCOM) 
Command and Control 
(C2) 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission.  C2 functions are 
performed through an arrangement of personnel, 
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission. (From Wikipedia)  
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Common Operational 
Picture (COP) 
The COP is the integrated capability to receive, 
correlate, and display a common tactical picture (CTP), 
overlays/projections (i.e., Meteorologic and 
Oceanographic {METOC}, battleplans, force position 
projections). Overlays and projections may include 
location of friendly, hostile, and neutral units, assets, and 
reference points. The COP may include information 
relevant to the tactical and strategic level of command. 
This includes, but is not limited to, any geographically 
oriented planning data from JOPES, readiness data from 
SORTS, intelligence (including imagery overlays), 
reconnaissance data from the Global Reconnaissance 
Information System (GRIS), weather from METOC, 






The CTP is derived from the Common Tactical 
Dataset and other sources and refers to the current 
depiction of the battle space for a single operation within 
a CINC's AOR including current, anticipated or 
projected, and planned disposition of hostile, neutral, and 
friendly forces as they pertain to US and multinational 
operations ranging from peacetime through crisis and 
war. The CTP includes location, RT and non-real time 
sensor information, and amplifying information such as 
METOC, SORTS, and JOPES. The CTP receives its 
information from the component’s Component 
Consolidated Pictures (CCPs), the COP, national 
sources, and other producers of information that report 
directly to the JTF. 




DRM is critical to organize efficiently the cooperation 
between operating systems. DRM manage all resources 
in a large distributed system to fulfill IFC scenario 
requirements and to use the resources effectively and 
efficiently. 
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Family of Systems (FoS) A set or arrangement of independent systems that can be arranged or interconnected in various ways to 
provide different capabilities. The mix of systems can be 
tailored to provide desired capabilities dependent on the 
situation. (From CJCSI 3170.01B) 
 
Functional Flow Block 
Diagram (FFBD) 
An FFBD is a pictorial representation of some process or 
model of a complex system. An FFBD shows major 
functions, sequence of occurrence, and functional 
decomposition. (From Wikipedia) 
FORCEnet An operational construct and architectural framework 
that integrates the SEAPOWER21 concepts of Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing by connecting 
warriors; sensors, networks; command and control; 
platforms and weapons; providing accelerated speed and 
accuracy of decision; and integrating knowledge to 
dominate the battlespace.  FORCEnet provides the 
following capabilities: Expeditionary, multi-tiered, 
sensor and weapon grids; distributed, collaborative, 
command and control; dynamic, multi-path survivable 
networks; adaptive/automated decision aids; and human-
centric integration. 
Global Command and 
Control System – 
Maritime (GCCS-M) 
GCCS-M [AN/USQ-119E(V)], previously the Joint 
Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), is the 
Navy's primary fielded Command and Control System.  
GCCS-M receives, processes, displays, and manages 
data on the readiness of neutral, friendly, and hostile 
forces in order to execute the full range of Navy missions 
(e.g., strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, 
etc.) in near-real-time via external communication 
channels, local area networks (LANs) and direct 
interfaces with other systems. (From Wikipedia) 
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Global Information Grid 
(GIG) 
GIG is defined as the globally interconnected, end-to-end 
set of information capabilities, associated processes, and 
personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to 
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.  The 
GIG includes all owned and leased communications and 
computing systems and services, software (including 
applications), data, security services, and other 
associated services necessary to achieve Information 
Superiority.  It also includes National Security Systems 
(NSS) as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen 
Act of 1996.  The GIG supports all DoD, National 
Security, and related Intelligence Community (IC) 
missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, 
and business) in war and in peace.  The GIG provides 
capabilities from all operating locations (bases, posts, 
camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and 
deployed sites).  The GIG provides interfaces to 




Information Exchange Requirements are statements that 
define a specific category of information that needs to be 
communicated between two parties or organizations. 
Most commonly IERs are used to define information 
exchange needs between data processing systems at two 
or more C2 nodes. Often IER statements are expanded to 
include additional parameters such as the bandwidth size, 
how frequently the information is exchanged, and the 
media over which it will be transmitted. The expanded 
versions of the IERs are used in modeling and simulation 
activities to determine or confirm the media bandwidth 
needed under various scenarios. (From DODCCRP) 
 
Integrated Fire Control 
(IFC) 
An Electronic System that locates and tracks a target, 
computes the data, and employs weapon to destroy it. 
(From Infoplease) 
    111
Interoperability The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide 
services to and accept services from other systems, units, 
or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together.  
The condition achieved among communications-
electronics systems or items of communications-
electronics equipment when information or services can 
be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them 
and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should 
be defined when referring to specific cases. (From Joint 
Publication 1-02) 
Joint Land Attack 
Cruise Missile Defense 
Elevated Netted Sensor 
System (JLENS) 
JLENS is a critical enabler of the Joint Theater Air and 
Missile Defense (JTAMD) system of systems. It employs 
advanced sensors and networking technologies to 
provide wide-area surveillance and precision-tracking 
capabilities for long-duration missions with a specific 
focus on land-attack cruise missile defense. The JLENS 
enables the precision tracking and illumination radar to 
support surface-based air defense assets in intercepting 
low-altitude airborne targets at long ranges. The JLENS, 
with its long on-station time, complements fixed-wing 
sensor assets of the other services and serves as a key 
member of the joint theater air and missile defense 
architecture, which capitalizes on the synergy delivered 




A mission capability package begins with a network-
centric operational concept, a concept of how a particular 
mission could be accomplished if everyone on the team 
were “on the net.”  Next an approach to command and 
control, organization, and doctrine that is designed for 
this “networked environment” is needed.  Following this, 
the network-centric environment must be created.  To 
complete the package, the education and training 
required to make it all function smoothly need to be 
specified.  Taken together the mission capability 
package contains everything necessary to implement a 
network-centric concept.  This approach enables a 
network-centric warfighting force. (From Report on 
Network Centric Warfare Sense) 
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Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) 
NCW is a new military doctrine or theory of war that 
seeks to translate an information advantage into a 
competitive warfighting advantage through robust 
networking of well informed geographically dispersed 
forces allowing new forms of organizational behavior. 
(From Wikipedia) 
Observe, Orient, Decide 
and Act (OODA) 
Col John Boyd developed the concept of the OODA 
Loop. The OODA cycle is crucial to understand if one is 
regularly in harms way. To effectively defeat opponents, 
the OODA cycle must be followed sequentially. This 
model can be used to dissect compressed timeframes in a 
logical and sequential manner.  
Open Architecture (OA) Open architecture is a type of computer architecture 
that allows users to upgrade their hardware in all of the 
computer hardware & components. Open architecture 
allows potential users to see inside all or parts of the 
architecture without any proprietary constraints. 
Typically, an open architecture publishes all or parts of 
its architecture that the developer or integrator wants to 
share. The open business processes involved with an 
open architecture may require some license agreements 
between entities sharing the architecture information  
(From Wikipedia) 
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Open System A system that implements sufficient open standards for interfaces, services, and supporting formats 
to enable properly engineered modules to be utilized 
across a wide range of systems with minimal changes, to 
interoperate with other modules on local and remote 
systems, and to interact with users in a style that 
facilitates portability. An open system is characterized by 
the following: 
1) Well defined, widely used, preferably non-
proprietary interfaces/protocols;  
2) Use of standards which are developed/adopted by 
recognized standards bodies or the commercial 
market place; 
3) Definition of all aspects of system interfaces to 
facilitate new or additional systems capabilities for a 
wide range of applications; 
4) Explicit provision for expansion or upgrading 
through the incorporation of additional or higher 
performance elements with minimal impact on the 
system. (From CRD) 
Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP) 
The SIAP (the air track portion of the CTP) 
consists of common, continual, and unambiguous tracks 
of airborne objects of interest in the surveillance area. 
SIAP is derived from real-time and near-real-time data 
and consists of correlated air object tracks and associated 
information. The SIAP uses fused near-real-time and 
real-time data, scaleable and filterable, to support 
situation awareness, battle management, and target 




SA is the ability to identify, process, and comprehend the 
critical elements of information about what is happening 
to the team with regards to the mission. (From U.S. 
Coast Guard) 
System Architecture A representation of an engineered system, and the 
process and discipline for effectively implementing the 
design for such as system. A system may consist of 
information, hardware and software.  
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Track A set of detections, contacts, hits or observations, 
generated by the same real object in the environment.  It 
is identified by a track number, and has intrinsic and 






APPENDIX E. STATEMENT OF WORK 
Title: Open Architecture as an Enabler for FORCEnet 
 
Scope: 
The tasking provided by this statement of work (SOW) supports a series of ongoing 
FORCEnet (Fn) studies being performed by Naval Postgraduate School MSSE (DL) 
students1.  This task is unique in that it investigates tie role of Fn and the Open 
Architecture (OA) Functional Domain Model whereas the other tasks investigate the 
concept of coalition Fn and its related performance and acquisition issues. 
 
This task is also unique in that it consists of two parts, one to be performed by the 
students (and is driven by the period of performance available to the students) and a 
second that can be performed concurrently as faculty research or as a future student 
project. 
 
As noted in the Background section, there are two operationally oriented scenarios 
selected to validate the Fn Architecture (time-critical targeting and cruise missile 
defense).  This study will focus on elements of the cruise missile defense problem 
 
Background: 
If FORCEnet is to be the architectural framework for naval warfare in the information 
age, it must deliver performance, information assurance, and quality of-service 
guarantees unprecedented in a system with the nodal diversity evidenced in the joint 
force. This challenge is best met incrementally so that existing capability is not degraded 
nor information security ever compromised. The design and implementation of complex 
systems for purposes of warfighting require a dedicated core of warfighters and system 
engineers trained in the art of operations analysis. Together, warfighters and engineers 
                                                 
1 Two previous MSSE (DL) classes evaluated the role of FORCEnet in coalition warfare and currently 
there are two follow-on coalition Fn projects that are examining performance and acquisition issues. 
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make decisions about when and how to introduce new capabilities as technologies and 
operational concepts evolve in independent but integrated spirals.2 
 
The FORCEnet information architecture should be thought of as a boundary between 
layers of functionality that is held invariant (over long periods of time), thus allowing 
developments to proceed independently on all sides of the boundary. In the committee’s 
view, architecting FORCEnet is the process of defining thin waists, or boundaries, that 
are invariant and, when coupled with selected industrial standards and throttled with a 
network control system, would enable FORCEnet to evolve with advances in technology. 
The boundaries standardize the interfaces between the functions common to all warfare 
systems so as to facilitate interoperability and information sharing. Examples of 
boundaries that should be established include those between sensor/intelligence networks, 
command-and-control networks, fire-control networks, displays, and databases, as shown 
in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
The open architecture initiative (OA) addresses software reuse as well as refresh. As a 
result, the granularity of partitions to that utilized in legacy architectures increases and 
raises concerns—the number of boundaries to be maintained may exceed the number that 
can be reasonably managed, and the functional partitions may not be optimally placed. In 
particular, the committee believes that as long as functional partitioning supports the 
                                                 
2 The material in this paper is extracted from Chapter 5 of FORCEnet Implementation Strategy 
(http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11456.html) 
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higher-level aggregation of interoperable functions, as suggested in Figure 5.1, it is 
acceptable, but the number of unique partition definitions should be minimized. The OA 
functional architecture shown in Figure 5.2, coupled with the FORCEnet information 
architecture described above, will, when implemented, greatly simplify the 
implementation of FORCEnet. 
 
 
FORCEnet and the fighting units and command-and-control structure that it supports are 
all subsystems of a joint battle force. Systems engineering is a process for allocating 
functionality to subsystems that are bounded by system architecture so that the 
probability of mission success is optimized within available resources. A battle force 
performs three major functions: it manages battle, dominates battlespace, and sustains 
control over the battlespace over time. FORCEnet functionality is a subset of battle force 
functionality that can contribute to battle management, battlespace dominance, and 
sustainability. FORCEnet cost and contribution to battle management, battlespace 
dominance, and sustainability should provide a basis for implementation decisions. As a 
subsystem, FORCEnet must interface seamlessly with the remainder of the force while 
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increasing the probability of mission success more than alternative investments. 
Understanding and defining the interfaces between what is in the FORCEnet subsystem 
and what is outside of it will be an ongoing process. This top-down view of FORCEnet, 
together with the bottom-up work that is being done at the information architecture 
boundaries, is necessary to explain and quantify the warfighting value. 
The FORCEnet functional architecture is based on MCPs. These are not the MCPs that 
the Warfare Integration Unit under the DCNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs 
(N70) uses for program assessment. Instead, two operationally oriented scenarios have 
been defined to validate the FORCEnet architecture: (1) time-critical targeting employing 
persistent sensors and (2) cruise missile defense. 
 
Selected Issues  
The following issues are an extract from Chapter 5 of FORCEnet Implementation 
Strategy (http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11456.html). This selected list captures some of the 
underlying research goals of this project:  
 
1. The process and tools for translating FORCEnet operational concepts into 
products, services, and warfighting capabilities have yet to be fully developed. 
Systems engineering is a process for allocating functionality to subsystems that 
are bounded by system architecture. 
 
2. The number of unique interfaces that must be maintained need to be carefully 
selected and kept to an absolute minimum, or evolution will be hindered by 
expensive and lengthy integration and testing. One way to do this is to require that 
systems must partition common functions in a common way. 
 
3. There has been little attempt to characterize how FORCEnet will function in 
terms of network management, data flow, traffic control, nodal performance, or 
data access. This information is required to engineer the FORCEnet network 
management system. 
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4. The FORCEnet network controls do not provide the capability to meter and to 
prioritize data flow across boundaries, and FORCEnet behavior models are not 
developed to project performance and to support sensitivity analysis. 
 
5. The reaction time of the joint force to sensor input is not a design-driving 




The focus of this engineering and analysis effort is to explore and develop a conceptual 
model that marries the operational and system Fn architecture requirements with the 
technical requirements of the OA Functional Domain Model.  This Work will be based 
upon the use of three Integrated Fire Control scenarios fro references 6 and 7 to elaborate 
upon the basic mission capability requirements of cruise missile defense.  Fn requires 
capabilities that enhance and enable tactical decision-making and distributed resource 
management.  The concept for optimizing the management of distributed warfare 
resources is based on the premise that edge devices consisting of common data fusion 
processes and decision-making aids can compute common decision results or resource 
allocations given a foundation of shared information and knowledge.  This is also the 
basis for the top level OA Functional Domain Model. 
 
Statement of Work: 
1. Characterization of the problem space:  the identification of current system and 
legacy deficiencies as well as constraints inherent in the operational environment 
in order to characterize, understand and bound the problem space.  The project 
team will translate relevant operational imperatives into system engineering 
structures (concepts, functions, requirements, solutions) necessary to develop the 
concept. 
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2. Design principles:  the formulation of principles for the design and architecting 
of OA and Fn (IFC) capabilities.  The design principles will serve as guidelines 
for the development of system solutions.  Design principles will consider known 
limitations and constraints of the operational environment such as communication 
challenges (unreliability, ad hoc mobile networks, limited bandwidth, etc.) and 
operator interaction (command authority, manual overrides, etc.). 
 
3. Conceptual design:  the development of a vision, architecture, and conceptual 
framework that addresses the problem space and is based on the design principles 
for a distributed system of automated decision aids for optimally managing 
warfare resources for collaborative operations.  
 
4. Functional representation and decomposition: the representation of system 
concepts through functional description and decomposition as well as system 
architecting and simulation.  Develop representations, models, and methods to 
express automated resource collaboration concepts and solutions in the context of 
the Fn/OA architecture and domains. 
 
5. Analysis of key capabilities:  the identification and evaluation of technologies 
and research areas that is key to the Fn/OA concept.  Technology areas that will 
be researched and analyzed include: 
a. Data fusion techniques and algorithms 
b. Resource management scheduling and optimization methods 
c. Weapon and sensor management for aerospace warfare 
d. Automated management aids 
e. Engagement functionality, initialization, and control 
f. Situation prediction and war-gaming 
g. Tactical planning and battle management 
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6. Documentation: The results of task 1-5 will be documented in accordance with 
the NPS MSSE(DL) Project Guide Requirements as modified by agreement with 
the project advisor. 
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